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Abstract
Recent growth in the size and scope of databases has resulted in more
research into making productive use of this data. Unfortunately, a
significant stumbling block which remains is protecting the privacy of
the individuals that populate these datasets. As people spend more
time connected to the Internet, and conduct more of their daily lives
online, privacy becomes a more important consideration, just as the
data becomes more useful for researchers, companies, and
individuals. As a result, plenty of important information remains
locked down and unavailable to honest researchers today, due to fears
that data leakages will harm individuals.
Recent research in differential privacy opens a promising pathway to
guarantee individual privacy while simultaneously making use of the
data to answer useful queries. Differential privacy is a theory that
provides provable information theoretic guarantees on what any answer
may reveal about any single individual in the database. This approach
has resulted in a flurry of recent research, presenting novel
algorithms that can compute a rich class of computations in this
setting.
In this dissertation, we focus on some real world challenges that
arise when trying to provide differential privacy guarantees in the
real world. We design and build runtimes that achieve the mathematical
differential privacy guarantee in the face of three real world
challenges: securing the runtimes against adversaries, enabling
readers to verify that the answers are accurate, and dealing with data
distributed across multiple domains.
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ABSTRACT
DISTRIBUTED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND APPLICATIONS
Arjun Narayan
Andreas Haeberlen
Recent growth in the size and scope of databases has resulted in more research
into making productive use of this data. Unfortunately, a significant stumbling
block which remains is protecting the privacy of the individuals that populate these
datasets. As people spend more time connected to the Internet, and conduct more of
their daily lives online, privacy becomes a more important consideration, just as the
data becomes more useful for researchers, companies, and individuals. As a result,
plenty of important information remains locked down and unavailable to honest
researchers today, due to fears that data leakages will harm individuals.
Recent research in differential privacy opens a promising pathway to guarantee
individual privacy while simultaneously making use of the data to answer useful
queries. Differential privacy is a theory that provides provable information theoretic guarantees on what any answer may reveal about any single individual in the
database. This approach has resulted in a flurry of recent research, presenting novel
algorithms that can compute a rich class of computations in this setting.
In this dissertation, we focus on some real world challenges that arise when trying
to provide differential privacy guarantees in the real world. We design and build
runtimes that achieve the mathematical differential privacy guarantee in the face
of three real world challenges: securing the runtimes against adversaries, enabling
readers to verify that the answers are accurate, and dealing with data distributed
across multiple domains.
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1
Introduction

Recent growth in the size and scope of databases has resulted in more research into
making productive use of this data. Unfortunately, a significant stumbling block
which remains is protecting the privacy of individuals that populate these datasets.
As people spend more time connected to the Internet, and conduct more of their
daily lives online, privacy becomes a more important consideration, just as the very
same data becomes potentially more useful for researchers, companies, and individuals. Today, plenty of important information is locked down and unavailable to
honest researchers due to fears that data leakages will harm individuals. Despite the
growth in useful datasets such as healthcare records and census records, these are
generally not available for academic or scientific use without great restrictions and
access controls. In some cases, as with healthcare records (CDC and HHS, 2003)
or educational records (O’Donnell, 2002), there are laws restricting how this information may be shared with any third party, regardless of their good intentions or
protections.
It is not just governments that collect large potentially useful datasets. Increas1

ingly, private companies are also stewards of large datasets. These companies wish to
use datasets such as Netflix’s movie ratings (Bell and Koren, 2007), Amazon’s retail
purchase histories (Linden, Smith, and York, 2003), and several companies that seek
to provide better targeted advertising (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012). Nevertheless,
sharing this data with researchers or other companies is not easy: it is unclear what
private information may be inadvertently revealed by sharing a particular dataset.
Even honest companies who spend lots of money and effort can get it wrong, by
making incorrect assumptions about the power of their adversaries (Narayanan and
Shmatikov, 2008). This uncertainty about the potential privacy losses creates an environment where data is seldom shared, even if there are large benefits from doing
so.
Recent research in differential privacy (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith,
2006b) gives us a promising way to quantify the privacy loss to individuals when
sharing private information. Differential privacy provides provable information theoretic guarantees on what any answer may reveal about any single individual in the
database. Unlike earlier work on data anonymization, which seeks to “scrub” a
dataset clean of identifying information, differential privacy is a property of queries.
In this setting, the private dataset is not revealed to the third party. Instead, a third
party can pose questions, incrementally consuming a privacy budget. Once the budget is depleted, no more questions are answered. This framework allows researchers
to make a strong case when asking for individuals to allow their data to be shared:
they can precisely quantify what will be revealed about any individual, in the worst
case situation. This powerful guarantee has resulted in a flurry of research (Dwork,
2008), presenting novel algorithms to compute a rich class of computations that
provide differential privacy.
However, in practice, differential privacy is hard to guarantee. While the guarantee can be achieved by several theoretical algorithms, executing those algorithms
safely requires sufficiently addressing additional concerns. First and foremost is se-
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cure execution. If arbitrary (and potentially adversarial) queriers supply programs, we
need to ensure that those queries are safe. Even if we can certify that their outputs
are differentially private, the programs may exploit side channels, such as the time
taken to run to completion. A second concern is the fact that private data is often
dispersed across multiple administrative domains, and some important queries cannot be cleanly broken down into sub-queries that can be answered individually, and
then post-processed into a final result. Third is the concern that differentially private
answers are noised, and thus contain an element of plausible deniability on the part
of the database owner. Thus, if there is the possibility of fraudulent answers, queriers
have no way of knowing whether the answer was computed correctly, and the noise
added honestly from a random distribution. For differential privacy to be usable
in the real world, we need to build systems that sufficiently address these practical
concerns.

1.1 Thesis
In this dissertation, we focus on real world scenarios that pose significant challenges
when providing differential privacy guarantees in practice. A differential privacy
system needs to address the following three needs:
• Secure execution: A runtime needs to be secure against malicious adversaries
that attempt to breach the query system’s guarantees via malicious queries that
attempt to infer additional information via side channels such as execution
time. Without this starting guarantee, any theoretical privacy guarantees on
the output can be circumvented and rendered useless.
• Distributed execution: A runtime should be able to answer questions when the
underlying data is distributed among multiple parties who may not necessarily
trust each other to combine their datasets.

3

• Verifiable answers: Answers should be provably correct, and these proofs should
be efficiently checkable. A proof of correctness that a given answer is differentially private should also not leak any additional private information.

1.2 Contributions
In this dissertation, we make the following contributions to address those concerns:
1. We present Fuzz, a differentially private database engine that provides secure
execution, protecting against side channel and covert channel attacks.
Our key insight is using a new primitive that we call predictable transactions executing differentially private queries such that the execution takes a precise
predetermined amount of time, regardless of the value of the final result.
2. We present DJoin, a differentially private database engine that can answer
queries about private data that is spread across multiple different databases.
DJoin can support many SQL-style queries, including joins on databases maintained by mutually untrusting entities.
Our key insight is that some useful JOINs can be expressed as set intersections,
for which there are existing private algorithms. We modify one such algorithm
to make it differentially private, and rewrite our queries to use the underlying
set intersection primitive for execution.
3. We present VerDP, a system for private data analysis that provides both strong
integrity and strong differential privacy guarantees. This allows a querier to
verify that a given differentially private answer was generated honestly, and
without any errors in its calculation.
The main challenge in verifying execution traces of a differentially private query
processor is that the structure of the trace can leak information by itself, even
if the verification is done by using a zero-knowledge proof. Our key insight is
4

that we can transform Fuzz programs to a variant where the circuit generated
from the execution trace is also private, allowing us to safely release it, along
with a zero-knowledge proof that it was executed honestly on the underlying
dataset.

1.3 Outline
1. We begin in chapter 2 with some background material on differential privacy,
as well as discussing related work on building differentially private systems.
2. We describe in chapter 3 the design of a system, Fuzz, that guarantees secure
execution in the setting where the database and runtime is located at a single
party.
3. We then describe in chapter 4 the design of DJoin, which allows for Join queries
in the multiparty setting.
4. We describe in chapter 5 the design of VerDP, a system that gives zeroknowledge proofs of correct execution in addition to differentially private
answers, allowing readers to verify the correctness of private results.
5. In chapter 6, we conclude with a discussion of potential future work.

5

2
Background and related work

2.1 Privacy
In many situations, participants in a computation care that their data will be kept
private. This can be a nebulous and ill-defined requirement (Acquisti and Grossklags,
2007), and often depends on the specific use-case in question. In this dissertation I
focus on one specific situation: where datasets are collected explicitly for the purpose
of using the data in aggregation. This is typical of statistical research, where a single
anecdote is anyway not scientifically relevant. However, this definition of privacy
specifically ignores other settings, such as private outsourced computation (Atallah
and Frikken, 2010) or transmitting private conversations (Garfinkel, 1995), where
the term privacy is used in reference to hiding information from third parties entirely.
In this setting, the first and most basic approach to ensuring database privacy
before releasing a dataset is anonymization. Anonymization is the process by which
a dataset is stripped of explicitly identifying information , such as names and social security numbers. While necessary, this is, however, insufficient on its own
6

in the face of adversaries that have auxiliary information about a potential victim.
This adversarial information can appear innocuous, making reasoning about it on
a case-by-case basis infeasible. For instance, in a linkage attack, a publicly available
non-anonymized database is linked back on an individual-by-individual level to the
anonymized database, allowing adversaries to deanonymize the dataset. For example,
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) deanonymized the anonymized Netflix dataset by
linking it to the public IMDB dataset, as many viewers had rated some movies on
both datasets. Consider an example user Alice, who likes watching movies. She
watches some some set of movies A that she is comfortable being publicly linked
to her identity. She rates these movies on a public website such as IMDB. There
is also a second set of movies that she watches, B that she is embarrassed about.
However, in her private Netflix account, she rates both A and B. If Netflix releases
a deanonymized set of ratings, a linkage attack can link the common subset A between both accounts, which, in effect, means that her ratings for the set B are now
also public.
Linkage attacks can be mitigated by only releasing aggregate statistics. A privacy
criterion known as K-anonymity, first formalized by Sweeney (2002), is the condition that no single aggregate statistic is released unless at least k individuals are in the
aggregation. This gives every user a crowd of k − 1 others to hide in. This, however,
has two flaws: it first results in a steep decrease in utility (Aggarwal, 2005) for high
dimensional datasets, and second, it is still not completely secure: K-anonymity is
not safe in the face of powerful adversaries. While a linkage attack would not work
against a k−anonymized dataset, an adversary who knew the information of k − 1
other individuals can still learn information about single users. A second attack is
possible if the adversary controls the questions asked, and can ask multiple questions.
Consider a database of private salary information of computer science professors at
the University of Pennsylvania. An adversary could ask for the average salary of all
the professors in August 2015. Since there are a large number of professors in the
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department, this satisfies the k−anonymity rule even with a large k (which is presumably, more private). In September 2015, a new professor joins. The adversary asks
the same question, and can thus calculate the new professor’s exact salary. The flaw is
that the meta-query (constructed by the difference of the two queries) has exactly 1
person in the set (breaking the k limit on any question). In general, reasoning about
all possible meta-queries that are composed of answered queries grows exponentially.
Thus, K-anonymization does not give us the strong privacy guarantees we desire.
Finally, privacy is not just a concern when entire datasets are released. while the
Netflix dataset deanonymization was done on an anonymized dataset released for
research purposes in improving their recommendation engine, just the recommendation engine itself can be used to break individual user’s privacy. For instance, Calandrino, Kilzer, Narayanan, Felten, and Shmatikov (2011) use a moderate amount
of auxiliary information to infer individual purchases based on the changes in what
the engine recommends over time.

2.2 Differential Privacy
Instead of attempting to scrub a dataset until it is “perfectly anonymized”, an impossible target (Dwork and Naor, 2008), we could try a second approach: releasing
just the result of a computation based on the private data, without releasing the
dataset itself. This is considerably more private, and, if done carefully, can leak almost no individual information at all. Nevertheless, this approach is still fallible:
powerful adversaries with lots of auxiliary information can still use the final result to
deduce information about individuals. A hypothetical adversary who knows everything about all users in the dataset except for Alice, can learn her information. This
is not as far fetched as it sounds, if the adversary can ask some questions, as in the
previous example with professor salaries, he can quickly launch a differential attack.
Differential Privacy is a stronger requirement: it information theoretically limits
what any query says about any single individual in the private dataset, regardless of
8

their auxiliary knowledge. Differential privacy is not a property of databases, but
a property of queries. The intuition behind differential privacy is that we bound
how much the output can change if we change the data of a single individual in the
database. Formally, if we encode an individual’s data as a single row in the database,
the property we desire is that for any two datasets d1 and d2 which differ in a single
row, a function f over the range of outputs R is ε -differentially private if for all subsets
S of R, it satisfies the following condition:
Pr[ f (d1 ) ∈ S] ≤ eε · Pr[ f (d2 ) ∈ S]

The above inequality means that any change in a single row results in at most a
multiplicative change of eε in the probability of any output. Differential privacy does
not guarantee that an adversary will not learn some private fact about you: instead,
it guarantees that the differentially private results will not raise the probability of any
adversary learning any individual’s private data by more than the factor eε , which is
≈ 1 + ε if ε ≪ 1.

Methods for achieving differential privacy can be attractively simple–e.g., perturbing the true answer to a numeric query with carefully calibrated random noise.
For example, the query “How many patients at this hospital are over the age of 40”
is intuitively “almost safe”: safe because it aggregates many individuals’ information
together, but only “almost” because, if an adversary happened to know the ages of
every patient except John Doe, then answering this query exactly would give him
certain knowledge of a fact about John. The differential privacy methodology rests
on the observation that, if we add a small amount of random noise to this query’s
result, we still get a useful estimate of the true answer while obscuring the age of any
single individual. By contrast, the query, “How many patients named John Doe are
over the age of 40?” is plainly problematic, since the answer is very sensitive to the
presence or absence of a single individual. Such a query cannot usefully be privatized: if we add enough noise to mostly obscure the contribution of John Doe’s age,
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there will be essentially no signal left.
A common way to achieve differential privacy for queries with numeric outputs
is the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b), which works as follows: Suppose
q̄ : I → R is a deterministic, real-valued function over the input data, and suppose q̄

has a finite sensitivity s to changes in its input, i.e., |q̄(d1 ) − q̄(d2 )| ≤ s for all similar
databases d1 , d2 ∈ I . Then q := q̄ + Lap( εs ), i.e., the combination of q̄ and a noise term
drawn from a Laplace distribution with scale parameter εs , is ε -differentially private.
This corresponds to the intuition that the more sensitive the query, and the stronger
the desired guarantee, the more “noise” is needed to achieve that guarantee.
Adding noise degrades the utility of the output, as compared to releasing the
unnoised deterministic answer itself, but if done carefully, we can limit the degradation to still useful levels. For example, in many statistical settings, there is already an
implicit level of noise (due to sampling error) in the data, so researchers are usually
prepared to deal with noise in the aggregate results anyway. Thus, for a small cost to
utility, we get strong privacy guarantees. Differential privacy systems are parameterized by a tunable ε parameter, which controls how private the answer is. Setting this
parameter is itself a complex task; Hsu, Gaboardi, Haeberlen, Khanna, Narayan,
Pierce, and Roth (2014) build threat models to determine how to precisely set ε ,
while still achieving reasonable utility from the result.

2.2.1

Compositionality and privacy budgets

An important consequence of the definition of differential privacy is that composing a differentially private function with any other function that does not, itself,
depend on the database yields a function that is again differentially private—that is,
no amount of post-processing, even with unknown auxiliary information, can lessen
the differential privacy guarantee. This allows us to reason about harmful effects of
data release that might seem quite far removed from the function that is actually
being computed.
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Another important property of differential privacy is that its guarantee degrades
gracefully under repeated application: a pair of two ε -differentially private functions
is always, at worst, 2ε -differentially private, when taken together. This allows us to
think of having a fixed “privacy budget” up front, which is slowly exhausted as queries
are answered: if our privacy budget is ε , we may feel free to independently answer k
queries, where the ith query is εi -differentially private and ∑i εi ≤ ε , without fear that
the aggregation of these k queries will violate ε -differential privacy.

2.2.2

Function sensitivity

The central idea in proofs of differential privacy is to bound the sensitivity of queries
to small changes in their inputs. Sensitivity is a kind of continuity property; a function of low sensitivity maps nearby inputs to nearby outputs.
Sensitivity is relevant to differential privacy because the amount of noise required
to make a deterministic query differentially private is proportional to its sensitivity.
For example, the sensitivity of the two age queries discussed above is 1: adding or
removing one patient’s records from the hospital database can change the true value
of each query by at most 1. This means that we should add the same amount of
noise to “How many patients at this hospital are over the age of 40?” as to “How many
patients named John Doe are over the age of 40?” This may appear counter-intuitive,
but it achieves the right goal: the privacy of single individuals is protected to exactly
the same degree in both cases. What differs is the usefulness of the results: knowing
the answer to the first query with, say, a typical error margin of ±100 could still
be valuable if there are thousands of patients, whereas knowing the answer to the
second query (which can only be zero or one) ±100 is useless. We might try making
the second query more useful by scaling its answer up numerically: “Is John Doe over
40? If yes, then 1000, else 0.” But this scaled query now has a sensitivity of 1000,

not 1, and so 1000 times the noise must be added, blocking our attempt to violate
privacy.
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2.2.3

The Distributed Setting

This privacy guarantee on the output of the process, while involving considerable
effort to guarantee, is still only one part of the story. In the single-party setting
it is sufficient (as long as the single party who sees the private data is trusted, and
safe from side channel attacks). However, if the computation is distributed among
several administrative domains, we have to additionally consider how the distributed
computation itself leaks between the domains: if Alice has trusted Bob with her
private data, she may not authorize Bob to share her data with Carol in order to
jointly compute some statistical results for David. Thus, our goal is to build systems
that allow Bob to give provable privacy guarantees to Alice, while still performing
distributed computations with Carol that have meaningful use. Thus, these privacy
guarantees are with respect to Carol and David.
To avoid this case-by-case reasoning, a best-case criterion introduced in McGregor, Mironov, Pitassi, Reingold, Talwar, and Vadhan (2010) would be that the entire
transcript of messages in a distributed computation, as well as the final result, is differentially private. This is the strongest possible guarantee, but results in degraded
utility: we could potentially achieve better by allowing for distributed databases to
communicate using cryptographically secure messages, or participate in secure multiparty computation protocols. While this is not information theoretically private,
this is still a reasonable assumption in practice. Thus, our guarantees are weakened such that the transcript and output is only computationally differentially private (Mironov, Pandey, Reingold, and Vadhan, 2009).

2.3 Related Work
In this section, we briefly summarize some related systems that provide differential
privacy, in both the single party setting, and the distributed setting.
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2.3.1

The Single Database Setting:

The first system that is most relevant is PINQ (McSherry, 2009). PINQ is a database
engine in the client-server setting, which accepts queries from clients written in a
privacy aware version of the LINQ language. PINQ is the most general purpose
language: it contains a rich set of operators on the underlying data, like joins and
group-bys, and supports arbitrary lambda functions in conjunction with these operators. PINQ thus allows for a rich set of queries, but as we will discuss in Chapter 3,
does not provide for secure execution in the face of adversarial queriers who wish to
exploit side channels in order to break the differential privacy guarantees.
The second system that is most relevant is Airavat (Roy, Setty, Kilzer, Shmatikov,
and Witchel, 2010). Airavat is a differentially private query engine that executes
queries with a MapReduce structure. Querier provided Mappers functions are restricted to observing a single database row, and have a system enforced maximum
sensitivity. Airavat implements some trusted reducers, which in combination with
the querier-provided Mappers, can provide differentially private results.

2.3.2

The Horizontally Partitioned Distributed Setting:

In this setting, the data is sharded across multiple curators, but each curator holds a
subset of the rows, with the exact same columns. Systems can only execute queries
that can be broken down into sub-queries executed over each shard, and then aggregated separately.
PDDP, by Chen, Reznichenko, Francis, and Gehrke (2012), is a system for differentially private web-analytics in the horizontally partitioned setting. Analysts wish
to observe browsing behaviors of users in aggregate, but users want their individual
private data protected from the analysts. PDDP’s solution is to use an intermediate
proxy, which sits between the (potentially multiple) analysts and the clients (which
live on the individual users’ computers). The analysts receive differentially private
answers to their queries. PDDP requires that the proxy be trusted to add noise to
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the answers, and not collude with the analysts. In return, by following this protocol,
individuals are guaranteed that the analysts do not learn much about any single one
of them.
SplitX, by Chen, Akkus, and Francis (2013), is an evolution of the PDDP design,
and focuses on the same setting of analysts and distributed horizontally-partitioned
clients. However, instead of a single proxy it relies upon three separate parties: two
mixes and an aggregator. By splitting the responsibilities for privacy between three
parties, it uses one-time pads to get much better performance than PDDP. However,
in exchange, the system is reliant upon an additional assumption that no two of the
three parties collude.
“Peers for Privacy” or P4P, by Duan, Canny, and Zhan (2010), is a system designed to execute machine learning workloads in a distributed private fashion. Users
have private vectors, which are collected to form a matrix. Users use a secret sharing
scheme to break up their data into two separate secrets, which are sent to two separate servers. The servers aggregate this information. When they combine the data,
only the aggregated data is available to the servers. The servers can then execute any
arbitrary function over the aggregated matrix. The motivation for P4P is to perform
private singular value decompositions (SVDs) of the user data matrix.

2.3.3

The General Distributed Setting:

A different, more general setting, concerns data that is not just horizontally partitioned. Here, different users may have different columns of the dataset, in addition
to different subsets of rows.
In this setting, one important primitive required is distributed noise generation.
If many users wish to collaboratively aggregate their results privately, they need a
protocol by which they can aggregate their results and add noise to it. Since for
privacy purposes noise only needs to be added once, if every user adds noise independently at random, this results in excess noise. Secure multiparty computation
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(SMC) (Yao, 1982) allows users to collaboratively execute a shared circuit, such that
only the final result is revealed, and every user’s individual input (and intermediate
stage of the computation) is kept secret. Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov,
and Naor (2006a) presents an efficient circuit that adds noise. This is crucial, as
SMC is computationally very expensive to run, and requires small circuits to be
feasible. Critically, SMC can compute any function, thus freeing users from the restrictions of the horizontal partitioning setting. Once a final result is computed, the
distributed noise generation circuit is used to add Laplace noise to the final result,
before it is released.
Finally, Shi, Chan, Rieffel, Chow, and Song (2011a), details the design of a system for “Private Stream Aggregation”, or (PSA). In this setting, users also wish to
collaboratively generate a differentially private aggregation of their inputs. However, this setting assumes a stronger threat model than SplitX or PDDP: users do
not have a single (or multiple) servers that they trust, even partially. Unlike Dwork
et al. (2006a), where users execute a secure multiparty computation synchronously
over a network, in PSA, users wish to execute results asynchronously, after an initial
setup phase. In particular, users wish to execute a large number of aggregations.
This is motivated by the setting of “time series data”: for example, if users had smart
meters but want their privacy protected, they would consent to differentially private
aggregations of their data, but the utility provider would like periodic meter readings
that are unbounded in time.
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3
Securing Differentially Private Runtimes

3.1 Introduction
Early work on differentially private data analysis relied on manual proofs by privacy
experts that the answers to particular queries were safe to release (McSherry and
Mironov, 2009); today, systems like PINQ (McSherry, 2009) and Airavat (Roy et al.,
2010) can perform differentially private data analysis automatically, without needing
a human expert in the loop.
Airavat and PINQ go beyond just certifying queries by the data owner as differentially private; they are explicitly designed to support untrusted queries over private
databases. In this model, a third party is permitted to submit arbitrary queries over
the database, but the data owner imposes a privacy budget that limits the amount
of information the third party can obtain about any individual whose data is in the
database. The system analyzes each new query to determine its potential privacy cost
and allows it to run only if the remaining balance on the privacy budget is sufficiently
high. This mode of operation is attractive for many scenarios; for example, Netflix
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could give researchers access to its database of movie ratings via such a query interface
and still give strong privacy assurances to customers. An adversarial querier could
not, for instance, obtain an accurate answer to the query “Has John Doe watched any
adult movies?” because the cost of such a query would exceed any reasonable privacy
budget.
However, Airavat and PINQ both contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
an adversary to extract private information through covert channels.1 The reason is
that these systems rely on the assumption that the querier can observe only the result
of the query, and nothing else. In practice, however, the querier is also able to observe
other effects of his query, such the time it takes to complete. Such observations can
be exploited to mount a covert-channel attack. To continue with our earlier example,
the adversary might run a query that always returns zero as its result but that takes
one hour to complete if John Doe has watched adult movies and less than a second
otherwise. Both Airavat and PINQ would consider the output of such a query to
be safe because it does not depend on the contents of the private database at all.
However, the adversary can still learn with perfect certainty whether John Doe has
watched adult movies—a blatant violation of differential privacy. PINQ’s prototype
implementation also permits global variables to be used as covert channels to leak
private information during query execution.
Covert channels have plagued computer systems for many years (Lampson, 1973;
Wray, 1991; Askarov, Zhang, and Myers, 2010; Shroff and Smith, 2008; Agat, 2000;
Kang, Moskowitz, and Lee, 1996; Hu, 1991, etc.), and they are notoriously difficult to avoid (Crosby, Wallach, and Riedi, 2009). However, they are particularly
devastating in a system that is designed to enforce differential privacy: if a channel
allows the adversary to learn even a single bit of private information, the differential
privacy guarantees are already broken! Thus, differential privacy puts particularly
high demands on a defense against covert channels; merely limiting the bandwidth
1 The

designers of these systems were aware of these covert channels, and each addresses them to
some extent. See Sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6.
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of the channels is not enough.
Fortunately, the untrusted-query scenario has two features that make a solution
feasible. First, there is no need to allow the querier direct access to the machine
that hosts the database; he can be forced to submit queries and receive results over
the network. This rules out difficult channels such as power consumption (Kocher,
Jaffe, and Jun, 1999) and electromagnetic radiation (Gandolfi, Mourtel, and Olivier,
2001; Quisquater and Samyde, 2001), essentially leaving the adversary with just two
channels: the privacy budget and the query completion time.
Our key insight is that, in this specific scenario, these two channels can be closed
completely through a combination of two techniques. The budget channel can be
closed by using program analysis to statically determine the privacy cost of each
query. Thus, the deduction from the privacy budget is independent of the database
contents. The external timing channel can be closed by a) breaking each query into
“microqueries” that operate on a single database row at a time, and by b) enforcing
that each microquery takes a fixed amount of time. (If necessary, the microquery is
aborted and a default value is returned. In the context of differential privacy, this is
safe—and does not open another channel—because the privacy cost of the default
values is already included in the privacy cost of the query.) Thus, we can obtain
strong privacy assurances even if the adversary can pose arbitrary queries and can
observe all the (remotely measurable) channels that are possible in our model.
We present the design of Fuzz, a system that implements this defense. Fuzz
uses a type system from Reed and Pierce (2010) to statically infer the privacy cost
of arbitrary queries written in a special programming language, and it uses a novel
primitive called predictable transactions to ensure that a potentially adversarial computation completes within a specific time or returns a default value. We have built
and evaluated a proof-of-concept implementation of Fuzz based on the Caml Light
runtime system (Leroy, 1990; Leroy and Doligez, 2004). Our results show that Fuzz
effectively closes all known remotely exploitable channels, at the expense of a higher
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query completion time.
Implementing predictable transactions is challenging in practice: Fuzz must be
able to abort an arbitrary and potentially adversarial computation by a specified
deadline, even if the adversary is actively trying to cause the deadline to be missed,
and must ensure that—whether or not the computation is aborted—it leaves no lingering traces that can measurably affect the program’s overall execution time (garbage
in the heap, VM pages that must later be freed by the OS, etc).
Nevertheless, we show that, across a variety of adversarial queries that exploit
different attack strategies, our implementation exhibits extremely small variation
in completion time—on the order of the time required to handle a single timer
interrupt. This variation is so small that it is difficult to measure even on the machine
itself. Thus, it would be useless to a remote attacker, who would have to measure it
across a wide-area network using the limited number of trials that the privacy budget
permits.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this chapter:
1. a detailed analysis of several classes of covert-channel attacks and a discussion
of which are feasible in PINQ and Airavat (Section 3.3);
2. an analysis of the space of potential solutions (3.4);
3. a concrete design for one specific solution, based on default values and predictable transactions (3.5+3.6);
4. a proof-of-concept implementation of our design (3.7); and
5. an experimental evaluation (3.8).
We close with a discussion of related work and a few concluding thoughts.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1

Programming with privacy

Early work on differential privacy has mostly focused on specific algorithms rather
than general, compositional mechanisms: given a particular algorithm, we prove by
hand that it is differentially private. Most of the time, this does not require much
ingenuity—just applying known techniques—but even so, this approach doesn’t
scale well because it demands that each new algorithm be certified by a skilled,
trusted human. A better approach is to automate this certification process with a
programming language in which every well-typed program is guaranteed to be differentially private. Then (untrusted) non-experts can write as many different algorithms as they like, and the database administrator can rely on the language to ensure
that privacy is not being violated.
Systems are beginning to be available that implement such languages—notably
Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ) (McSherry, 2009) and Airavat (Roy et al., 2010).
PINQ is an embedded extension of C# that tracks the privacy impact of variety of
relational algebra operations on database tables, as well as certain forms of query
composition. Airavat integrates differential privacy into a distributed, Java-based
MapReduce framework.

3.2.2

Processing model

Although PINQ and Airavat differ in many particulars, they embody essentially the
same basic processing model, which we also follow in the Fuzz system described
below. A query in each of these systems can be viewed as consisting of one or more
mapping operations that process individual records in the database, together with
some reducing code that combines the results of the mapping operations without
directly looking at the database. When a query is submitted, the system verifies that
it is εi -differentially private, deducts εi from the total privacy budget ε associated
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with the database, and—if ε remains nonzero—returns the query result. (Note that,
in this model, we account for the possibility of collusion between adversaries by
associating the privacy budget with the database and not with individual queriers.
Thus, once the budget is exhausted, we must throw away the database and never
answer any more queries.) We call the mapping operations microqueries and the rest
of the code the macroquery.
Airavat implements a simple version of this model: a query consists of a sequence
of chained microqueries (“mappers” in Airavat terminology) plus a selection from
among a fixed set of macroqueries (“reducers”). The mappers are the only untrusted
code: the reducers are part of the trusted base. When a query is submitted, the adversary must also declare the expected numerical range of its outputs, which amounts
(since its input is a single record of the database) to stating its sensitivity. If the
actual output ever falls outside of the declared range, it is clipped—in essence, the
declared sensitivity is enforced by the system. From the declared sensitivity, Airavat can calculate how much noise must be added to the reducer’s results to achieve
ε -differential privacy.

In PINQ, macroqueries are written in LINQ, a SQL-like declarative language,
which can be embedded in otherwise unconstrained C# programs. Microqueries
can be general C# computations (optionally constrained by a checker method called
Purify; see Section 3.3.5).

3.3 Attacks on differential privacy
Naturally, database administrators may be nervous about offering adversaries the
opportunity to run arbitrary queries against their raw data. They will need strong
assurances that such adversarial queries not only play by the rules of differential
privacy but also have no indirect means of improperly leaking private information
about individuals in the database. Unfortunately, this is not currently the case: while
the authors of both PINQ and Airavat have anticipated the possibility of covert21

channel attacks and have implemented either a partial defense (Airavat) or hooks for
adding one (PINQ), both systems remain vulnerable to a range of attacks, as we now
demonstrate.

3.3.1

Threat model

It is well known that covert channels are essentially impossible to eliminate if we
allow the adversary to run other processes on the same computer that runs the query.
Even if these other processes have no access to the database and cannot communicate
directly with the query process, there are just too many ways for the query process to
perturb local conditions in ways that can be measured fairly accurately if the observer
is this close—e.g., processor usage, disk activity, cache pollution, etc. However, if
we assume that the adversary is on the other end of a network connection, we have a
much better chance of success. This is fortunate, since the demands of the situation
are very strong. It is not enough to limit leakage to a low bandwidth or a small
number of bits: even one bit is too much if that bit is the answer to Does John Doe
watch adult movies?
We therefore assume that the database and associated query system are hosted
on a private, secure machine. The adversary does not have physical access to this
machine or its immediate environment (so that there is no way to measure its power
usage, etc.) and can only communicate with it over a network. The adversary submits arbitrary queries to the system over the network. The system executes each
query (if it determines that doing so is safe) and returns the answer over the network. The system also maintains a privacy budget for the database as a whole, and
it refuses to answer any more queries once the budget is exhausted.
This threat model is shared by all differentially private query systems (PINQ,
Airavat, and our Fuzz system), and its assumptions seem reasonable in practice. Essentially, it gives the adversary three pieces of information: (1) the actual answer to
their query (a number, histogram, etc.), if any, (2) the time that the response arrives
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on their end of the network connection, and (3) the system’s decision whether to
execute their query or refuse because doing so would exceed the available privacy
budget. However, this threat model still provides plenty of room for attacks on privacy. We will see that, unless appropriate steps are taken, both the decision whether
or not to execute a query and the execution time itself can be used as channels to leak
private information. In essence, both the query’s finishing time and the fact that it is
accepted or refused are results that the system is giving back to the adversary, and we
need to consider whether the combination of all results—not just the query’s numerical answer—is differentially private. Moreover, we will see, for PINQ, some ways
that a malicious query may cause the actual answer to not be differentially private.

3.3.2

Timing attacks

Under the constraints of the above threat model, the easiest way for a query to send a
bit to the adversary is by simply pausing for a long time (by entering an infinite loop,
computing factorial of a million, etc.) when a certain condition is detected in the
private data, as illustrated (in PINQ-like pseudocode) in Figure 3.1. The macroquery
adds together the results of running the microquery on each row of the database
(always 0) and finally adds some random noise to the total. Since almost all of the
microquery instances finish very quickly, the distribution of query execution times
observed by the adversary will change significantly when an embarrassing record
exists in the database—a violation of differential privacy.
A simple “microquery timeout” will not solve this problem, for at least two reasons. First, the adversary can also signal the condition by causing the query to take
an unusually small amount of time. The simple way to do this is to create an exception condition that aborts the entire query. If this is blocked (e.g., by trapping
an exception in a microquery and replacing it with a default result just for that single microquery), the adversary can instead make all microqueries take a uniformly
longish time (say, exactly two milliseconds) except when they detect the condition,
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noisy sum, foreach r in db, of {
if embarrassing(r) {
pause for 1 second
};
return 0
}

Figure 3.1: Timing attack example
found = false;
noisy sum, foreach r in db, of {
if (found) then { return 1 }
if embarrassing(r) then {
found = true;
return 1
} else { return 0 }
}

Figure 3.2: State attack example
in which case they terminate immediately. If the adversary happens to know exactly
how many records are in the database, this leaks one bit. Second, the adversary can
defeat a simple “microquery timeout” by causing side-effects in the microquery that
will slow down the macroquery or other microqueries—for example, by allocating
lots of memory to trigger garbage collection in the macroquery. We discuss this issue
in more detail below.

3.3.3

State attacks

A different class of attacks involves using a channel between microqueries, such as a
global variable, to break differential privacy of the result, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
This time, the result of each microquery is either 0 or 1, depending on whether
any previous microquery detected an embarrassing record. Since, in general, the
embarrassing record will not be the last one in the database, this greatly magnifies
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noisy sum, foreach r in db, of {
if embarrassing(r) then {
run sub-query that uses
a lot of privacy budget
} else {
return 0
}
}

Figure 3.3: Privacy budget attack example
Constant execution time
Database size public
ε -differential privacy
Static enforcement
Dynamic enforcement

Exact timing analysis
Timeouts
Rounding up

Variable execution time
Database size private
(ε , δ )-differential privacy
Time bound analysis
Time noise
Timeouts
Time noise

Table 3.1: Four approaches to the timing-channel problem.
the contribution of this one record to the result, again violating differential privacy.

3.3.4

Privacy budget attack

A related form of attack uses the query processor’s decision whether to publicize the
result of a query as a channel for leaking private data, relying on the fact that this
decision can be influenced by actions of the query that in turn depend on private
data. This idea can be applied to systems that use a dynamic analysis to determine the
’privacy cost’ of a query, i.e., the amount that must be subtracted from the privacy
budget before the result can be returned to the querier. As illustrated in Figure 3.3,
the attack consists of looking for an embarrassing record and, when it is found,
invoking some sub-query that will use up a bit of the remaining privacy budget.
Once the outer query returns, the adversary simply checks how much the privacy
budget has decreased.
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3.3.5

Case study: PINQ

We have verified that the current PINQ implementation (version 0.1.1, released
08/18/09, available from (pinq)) is vulnerable to all of the above attacks. To demonstrate the vulnerabilities, we have written three example programs, each based on the
test harness that comes with PINQ.
The original test harness computes several differentially private statistics on a
given text file, including the number of lines that contain a semicolon. When the
program starts, it first reads the text file and creates a database whose rows each contain one line of text. Then it selects all the rows that contain a semicolon, using
microqueries with a boolean predicate p, and finally performs a noisy count on the
resulting set of rows.
Our attacks are implemented by changing the predicate p so that it produces
some observable side-effects when the input file contains a certain string s. For the
timing attack, we changed p so that, when invoked on a line that contains s, p performs an expensive computation that takes several seconds and cannot be optimized
out. For the state attack, we added a static variable that is incremented by p when
it discovers s, and we write the (un-noised) value of this variable to the console at
the end. For the budget attack, we added a different static variable that contains a
reference to the database; when s is found, p computes a noisy count of the number
of rows in the database, which decreases the privacy budget.
The possibility of such attacks is acknowledged in the PINQ paper (McSherry,
2009), and the PINQ implementation does contain hooks for an expression rewriter
(called Purify in (McSherry, 2009)) that is invoked on all user-supplied expressions
and could potentially change or remove code that causes side-effects. However, such
a rewriter is not provided; indeed, the PINQ downloads page contains an explicit
warning that the code is not hardened or secured and should not be used ‘in the
wild.’
We conjecture that implementing a reliable Purify will be far from trivial. Avoid26

ing the privacy budget attack will probably be easiest: every function that might
consume privacy budget could be wrapped with a check that raises an exception if
it is called from inside a running microquery (i.e., with a PINQ operation already
on the call stack); this exception could then be turned into a default result for the
microquery. State attacks are more difficult: since microqueries in PINQ are arbitrary bits of C#, it seems the choices are either to execute them on a modified
virtual machine that detects writes to global state (as Airavat does), or else to create a
small domain-specific language for writing microqueries that avoids global updates
by design (as we do in Fuzz). Addressing timing attacks will require deeper changes
to PINQ: the issues and available solutions are precisely the ones we study in this
chapter.

3.3.6

Case study: Airavat

Because Airavat calculates sensitivity and deducts the required amount from the privacy budget before query execution begins, it is inherently safe from privacy budget attacks. However, Airavat’s mechanism for preventing state attacks permits a
related vulnerability. To prevent microqueries from communicating via static variables, Airavat runs microqueries on a modified JVM; if a microquery ever attempts
to modify a static variable, an exception is thrown and the whole query is marked
“not differentially private.” Unfortunately, the adversary can now observe whether
the system gives them the result at the end of query execution or says, “Sorry, that’s
not differentially private.” A better alternative would be to abort just the microquery,
return, a default result, and allow the remainder of the query to run to completion.
In its published form, Airavat is also vulnerable to timing attacks. Its authors
acknowledge this weakness (Roy et al., 2010) but counter that the bandwidth of
the channel it creates is very low. This, we agree, may make it tolerable in some
contexts, e.g., with “mostly trusted” queriers that might be careless but will not
write malicious queries that intentionally attempt to reveal specific targeted secrets.
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We understand that Airavat may soon be enhanced to add timeouts to microquery
executions [Shmatikov, personal communication, July 2010]; the implementation
techniques described below should be useful in this effort.

3.4 Defending against timing attacks
State and privacy budget attacks can (and must) be addressed by designing the query
language so that they are impossible. Timing attacks require more work, and this
will be our concern for the remainder of the chapter.

3.4.1

Four approaches to the problem

There are two basic strategies. One is to ensure that a given query takes very close
to the same amount of time for all possible databases (of a given size—see below),
so that the adversary can learn nothing from observing the time it takes the query
result to arrive. The other is to treat time as an additional output of the query, and to
limit the amount of information the adversary can gain using the same mechanisms
(sensitivity analysis and appropriate perturbation) that are used for data outputs.2 In
either approach, we can either obtain the information about running time statically
(by analyzing the program before running it) or enforce limits dynamically (e.g., by
using timeouts). This gives us the four possibilities shown in Table 3.1.
The solutions in the right-hand column provide somewhat weaker privacy guarantees than those on the left. In order to properly “noise” a resource like time, we
must have the ability to both increase and decrease its consumption. While we can
clearly increase execution time by adding a delay, we cannot easily decrease it. We
can mitigate this problem by adding a default delay T ; thus, we can add “time noise”
ν ≥ −T by delaying for T + ν at the end of each query. Nevertheless, since noise dis-

tributions guaranteeing differential privacy have unbounded support (i.e., P(ν ) > 0
2 Note that the sensitivity analysis would have to account for interdependencies between a query’s

execution time and its output value, which is far from trivial.
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for all ν ), there is always a possibility that ν < −T , in which case we cannot complete the computation. Thus, ε -differential privacy seems impossible in practice; all
we can hope for is the slightly weaker property of (ε , δ )-differential privacy (Dwork
et al., 2006a), where δ is a bound on the maximum additive (not multiplicative)
difference between the probability of any given query output with and without a
particular row in the input.
On the other hand, in the constant-time solutions (left column), the size of the
database becomes public knowledge, since, except for the most trivial queries, execution time depends on the size of the database. In practice, this is probably a
reasonable concession. In the case of the variable-time solutions (right column), the
size of the database does not need to be published.
The static solutions (top row) are attractive in principle, but they depend on a
static analysis of time sensitivity—something that has proved challenging except for
very simple, inexpressive programming languages. We therefore concentrate on the
bottom row as being a more realistic target for a feasible implementation. In this row,
we choose one column to explore further: the “constant execution time” alternative,
where we try to make each microquery take as close as possible to exactly the same
amount of time. (The “variable execution time” column is in principle feasible and
also deserves exploration; we believe similar mechanisms will be required.)

3.4.2

Default values

The approach we explore in the rest of this chapter is to dynamically ensure that each
microquery m takes the exact same amount of time T . If the microquery takes less
time to execute, we delay it and only return its result after T . If the microquery has
executed for time T without returning a result, we abort it. However, aborting the
enclosing macroquery is not an option because this would leak information to an
adversarial querier. Instead, our approach is to have the microquery return a default
value d in this case.
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To avoid privacy leaks through the default value, d must not itself depend on the
contents of the database. In Fuzz, a static value for d is included with the query.
Also, for reasons that will become clear in Section 3.4.4, d should fall within the
range of the microquery m.

3.4.3

Do default values decrease utility?

When the microquery for a row r times out while answering a non-adversarial query,
the utility of the query’s overall result almost inevitably degrades. After all, the result
no longer incorporates the intended contribution of r or any other row whose microquery has timed out, but rather uses the default value for each such microquery.
However, a non-adversarial querier can always avoid the inclusion of any default
values by choosing a sufficiently high timeout. If the timeouts are chosen properly,
timeouts should never occur while answering non-adversarial queries. Thus, the only
querier who experiences degraded utility is the adversary.
The question, then, becomes how to choose the timeout values. One possible
method is as follows. The querier is supplied with a reference implementation of
the query processor that additionally outputs the maximum processing time Tmax
for each microquery. The querier can then (locally) test his queries on arbitrary
databases of his own construction and thus infer a reasonable time bound. The
querier then adds a small safety margin and uses, say, 1.1 · Tmax as the timeout for his
query. He then submits the query to the actual query processor, to be run on the
private database.

3.4.4

Do default values create privacy leaks?

At first glance, it may appear that default values are replacing one evil with another:
they seem to plug the timing channel at the expense of introducing a data channel.
However, this is not the case: as long as the timeouts are applied at the microquery
level (as opposed to imposing a timeout on the whole query), differential privacy is
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preserved, for the following reason.
First, recall that Fuzz is designed to ensure that the completion time of a query
depends only on the size of the database, but not its contents. Since we have assumed
that the size of the database is public, and since our threat model rules out all the
other channels, the only remaining way in which private information could ‘leak’ is
through the (noised) data that the query returns.
Now, recall that the type system Fuzz implements is based on the type system
from (Reed and Pierce, 2010). As described in (Reed and Pierce, 2010), this type
system ensures that all programs that type-check are differentially private. This is
achieved by inferring an upper bound on the program’s sensitivity to small changes
in its inputs—specifically, a change to an individual database row.
Fuzz extends the type system from (Reed and Pierce, 2010) with microquery
timeouts on map and split, but, crucially, timeouts do not increase the sensitivity of
these two functions. The reason is that the sensitivity of map and split depends on
the range of values that the microquery can return. Since the default value is taken
from the range of values that the microquery can already return in the absence of
timeouts, the addition of timeouts does not increase this range, and thus does not
increase the sensitivity either.
Of course, running a query on a given database with and without timeouts (or
with shorter vs. longer timeouts) can yield very different results. Suppose we have
a database b and a function with microqueries that, without timeouts, produces an
output o when it is run on b. If we now add a very short microquery timeout, we
can easily cause all the microqueries to abort and return their default value, and
the resulting output for the same database D can be dramatically different from o.
However, this does not mean that differential privacy is violated. Recall from Chapter 2 that the differential privacy guarantee makes a statement about running the
same query on two databases b and b′ that differ in exactly one row r. If we run a
query with timeouts on both b and b′ , the only microquery that could behave dif-
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Primitive
map db f T d
split db p T
count db
sum db

Arguments
Database db, function f, timeout T, default value d
Database db, boolean predicate p, timeout T
Database db
Database db

Return value
Database
Two databases
Noised |db|
Noised ∑i dbi

Table 3.2: Critical primitives in the Fuzz language
ferently is the one on row r. All the other microqueries start in the same state for
both databases, so their behavior will be exactly the same—they will either time out
on both b and b′ , or on neither.

3.5 The Fuzz system
Next, we present the design of the Fuzz system, which represents one specific point
(the lower left quadrant) in the solution space from Table 3.1. This point is a good
first step because it works with existing programming-language technology and is
relatively easy to implement.

3.5.1

Overview

Fuzz consists of three main components: a simple programming language, a type
checker, and a predictable query processor. The programming language rules out channels based on global state or side effects, simply by not supporting any primitives
that could produce either. The type checker rules out budget-based channels by
statically checking queries before they are executed and rejecting any query that cannot be guaranteed to complete with the available balance. Finally, the predictable
query processor closes timing-based channels by ensuring that each microquery terminates after very close to exactly a specified amount of time. Figure 3.4 illustrates
our approach.
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Type checker

Privacy
budget

Admission control
Predictable
query processor
Querier

Fuzz runtime

Network

Database

Figure 3.4: Scenario. Queries are first type-checked by Fuzz and then executed in
predictable time.

3.5.2

Language and type system

Fuzz queries are written in a simple functional programming language whose functionality is roughly comparable to PINQ. The Fuzz language contains a special type
db for databases, which is not a valid return type of any query. We say that a primitive

is critical if it takes db as an argument. Our language ensures that critical primitives
either return other values of type db (and nothing else) or add noise to all of their
return values. Fuzz determines the correct amount of noise to add by using the
sensitivity analysis and type system from (Reed and Pierce, 2010).
Fuzz currently supports four critical primitives (Table 3.2): map applies a function
f to each row in one database and returns the results in another database; split

applies a boolean predicate p to each row in a database and returns two databases,
one with all rows r for which p(r) = true and the other with the rest; count returns
the (noised) number of rows in a database; and sum returns the (noised) sum of all
the rows. sum’s type ensures that it can only be applied to databases with numeric
rows.

3.5.3

Predictable query processor

To close timing channels, the query processor must ensure that all critical primitives
take a predictable amount of time that depends only on the size of the database. This
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is trivial for sum and count. However, map and split involve arbitrary microqueries,
and it can be difficult to statically analyze how much time these will take.
To avoid the need for such an analysis, Fuzz instead relies on predictable transactions. A predictable transaction is a primitive p-trans(λ , a, T, d), where λ is a function, a an argument, T a timeout, and d a default value. p-trans takes exactly time
T , and returns λ (a) if λ terminates within time T , or d otherwise. Note that an

implementation of p-trans may have to (a) add a delay if λ terminates early, and
(b) abort λ slightly before T expires to ensure that any resources allocated by λ can
be released in time. In Section 3.6, we describe two approaches to implementing
p-trans in practice.

When evaluating map or split, Fuzz invokes p-trans for each microquery, using
the specified timeout T and—in the case of map—the specified default value (split
has an implicit default of true).
All values of type db internally have representations of the same size, i.e., they
consume the same amount of memory and (conceptually) have the same number of
rows as the original database. If necessary, they are padded with dummy rows. For
example, if the original database has 1,000 rows and consumes 1 MB of memory,
the two databases returned by a split both consume 1 MB, and an invocation of
map on either of them will invoke 1,000 microqueries—though of course the results

of microqueries on dummy rows will be discarded.

3.5.4

How Fuzz protects privacy

We now briefly summarize how Fuzz protects against covert channels. First, the only
observations a querier can make that depend on the contents of the database are the
completion time of the query and its return value. This is because of (a) our threat
model from Section 3.3.1, (b) the fact that the language contains no primitives with
side-effects, such as mutating global state, and (c) the fact that the type system rules
out abnormal termination.
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Second, the return value of the query is differentially private. Since db is not a
valid return type and critical operations return only values of type db or else appropriately noised values (based on the sensitivity that has been statically inferred (Reed
and Pierce, 2010)), the return value cannot depend on non-noised values from the
database directly. Also, the language does not contain any primitives for observing
side-effects within the query, such as memory consumption or the current wallclock
time. The only time-related primitives are the timeouts on the microqueries; these
have a sensitivity of 1 because (a) each microquery operates on only one row from the
database at a time, and (b) microqueries have no access to global state and therefore
cannot communicate with one another. Thus, if we add or remove one individual’s
data from the database, this affects only one row, so this can only cause one more
(or less) microquery to time out and add a default result to the output.
Third, the completion time of a query depends only on the size of the database
(which we assumed to be public) and data that has already been noised. To see
why, consider that the only operations that have access to non-noised data are the
microqueries, for which Fuzz enforces a constant runtime (by aborting or padding
them to their timeout), and that values of type db cannot affect the control flow
directly, only indirectly through return values of critical operations, which are noised.
It is perfectly OK for the completion time of a query to depend on noised data, since
such data is safe to release and could even have been returned to the querier directly.
In summary, Fuzz is designed to ensure that everything observable by the
querier—whether directly through the data channel or indirectly through the timing
channel—either does not depend on the contents of the database or has been noised
appropriately.

3.6 Implementation strategies
In this section, we describe the abstract requirements for implementing predictable
transactions, and we propose two concrete implementation strategies: one for newly
35

designed runtimes (3.6.2) and one for retrofitting Fuzz into an existing runtime
(3.6.3). Naturally, we expect the former to be more efficient and the latter to be
easier to implement.

3.6.1

Requirements

To implement p-trans(λ , a, T, d), the following three properties need to hold for the
language runtime:
• Isolation: λ (a) can be executed without interfering with the succeeding computation in any way, apart from contributing its return value.
• Preemptability: The execution of λ (a) can be aborted at any time, or at most
within some time bound ∆a ;
• Bounded deallocation: At any point during the execution of λ (a), there is a
upper bound ∆d on the time needed to deallocate all resources allocated so far
by λ (a).
If these requirements hold, we can implement p-trans by running λ (a) in isolation
and setting a timer to T − ∆a − ∆d (which must be updated when ∆d changes due
to new allocations). If the timer fires, we can abort λ and deallocate its resources
without overrunning the overall timeout T . After a final delay to reach T exactly, we
can return either the result of λ (a) if we have it, or d otherwise.

3.6.2

White-box approach

If we design a new language runtime from scratch, or if we are willing to make extensive changes to an existing runtime, we can achieve isolation and preemptability
by avoiding global variables that could be left in an inconsistent state when a microquery is aborted, as well as any termination of the microquery that does not correctly
return the default value. Thus, it becomes possible to abort a microquery simply by
performing a longjmp or its equivalent.
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Regarding bounded deallocation, we expect that the key resource in most cases
will be memory. It is possible to design the memory allocator in such a way that the
memory allocated by a microquery can be deallocated in constant time. For example, we can divert the allocator from its usual allocation pool while a microquery is
in progress, and instead allocate memory from a special region dedicated to microqueries. If the microquery takes arguments and returns results by value rather than
by reference, objects in the main heap cannot acquire references to this region, so
it is safe to summarily deallocate the entire region when the microquery aborts or
terminates.

3.6.3

Black-box approach

The first strategy assumes a fairly deep understanding of how all primitive operations
of the language are implemented, and how they interact with the allocator and each
other. If we are working with an existing runtime system, it may be hard to be sure
that the entire rest of the state of memory outside the microquery allocation region
has been restored to its original state after a microquery finishes; for example, if we
use any off-the-shelf library functions, they may have local buffers or other global
state through which information can leak.
In this case, we can still ensure isolation and preemptability by leveraging operating system support, e.g., by farming out microqueries to a separate process, which
can then be destroyed at any time without interfering with the state of the main
runtime. Bounded deallocation can be achieved if we know an upper bound on the
amount of time the operating system needs to destroy a process.

3.7 Proof-of-concept implementation
Next, we describe our proof-of-concept implementation of Fuzz. Our implementation does not execute Fuzz programs directly; rather, we implemented a frontend that accepts Fuzz programs, typechecks them, and then (if successful) translates
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them into Caml programs. Thus, we did not need to implement an entire language
runtime from scratch; it was sufficient to implement a library with Fuzz-specific
primitives like map and split, and to extend an existing runtime with support for
predictable transactions. We chose Caml because it is similar enough to Fuzz to
make the translation relatively straightforward.

3.7.1

Background: Caml Light

Our implementation is based on Caml Light (Leroy, 1990; Leroy and Doligez, 2004)
version 0.75, a stable and lightweight implementation of Caml. Here, we briefly
describe only the aspects of Caml Light that are relevant for our discussion of Fuzz.
For a detailed description of Caml Light, please see (Leroy, 1990).
In Caml Light, Caml code is first compiled into bytecode for an abstract machine called ZAM (the ZINC abstract machine); this bytecode is then executed on
a runtime that implements the ZAM. Because of this architecture, the actual ZAM
runtime is relatively simple: it mainly consists of an interpreter for the ZAM instructions and some code for I/O, memory management, and garbage collection.
The state of the ZAM consists of a code pointer, a register holding the current
environment, an accumulator, two stacks (an argument stack and a return stack)
and the heap. The heap is divided into two zones: a fixed-size ‘young’ zone and a
variable-size ‘old’ zone. Most objects are initially allocated in the young zone; when
this zone fills up, a ‘minor’ garbage collection copies any objects that remain active
into the old zone. This was originally done to reduce the frequency of ‘major’ garbage
collection runs (since most objects are short-lived, their space can be reclaimed very
quickly), but it is also very convenient for Fuzz, as we shall see below.
Note that Fuzz uses the ZAM runtime to run only programs that it has previously
translated from Fuzz programs. Thus, we can safely ignore features of the ZAM
runtime (such as reference cells) that Fuzz does not use. Our threat model assumes
that the adversary can submit only Fuzz programs, so he or she is unable to access
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any of these features.

3.7.2

Bounded deallocation

When a microquery times out, Fuzz must be able, within a bounded amount of time,
to release all of the resources the microquery may have allocated. To this end, our
implementation performs a minor collection at the beginning of each macroquery,
which clears the young zone of the heap, and it confines any additional memory
allocations during microqueries to the young zone. Thus, we can simply discard the
entire young zone after each microquery, which requires only a single instruction.
If the microquery completes normally (without a timeout), it writes its result into a
special fixed-size buffer that is not part of young zone. If this buffer is empty after
the microquery or contains only a partial result, the macroquery uses the default
value instead.
Discarding the entire young zone is safe because, after a microquery, there cannot
be any outside references to objects in that zone. Any new memory allocations must
be in the young zone, any new values on the stacks are discarded as well, and the
only objects in the old zone that could be modified in place are reference cells, which
translated Fuzz programs cannot use. Note that discarding the young zone is faster
than a minor collection, so this particular modification (which is only possible for
Fuzz programs, not for arbitrary Caml programs) actually results in a speedup.

3.7.3

Preemptability

Fuzz must be able to preempt a running microquery after a specified time, with
high precision. To this end, our implementation creates a second thread that continuously spins on the CPU’s timestamp counter (TSC).3 When a microquery is
started, the interpreter sets a shared variable to the time at which the preemption
should occur; when that point is reached, the second thread sends a signal to the
3 There

are many other ways of implementing preemptions, such as periodic TSC checks in the
interpreter loop, or using the CPU’s performance counters.
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interpreter thread. To prevent the two threads from slowing each other down, each
is pinned to a different CPU core. If the microquery terminates before the timeout,
it simply spins until the preemption occurs.
Preemptions can occur at arbitrary points in the runtime code. To avoid inconsistencies, our implementation checkpoints all mutable state before each microquery;
when the signal is raised, it uses longjmp to return to the macroquery and then restores the runtime state from the checkpoint. We exclude from the checkpoint any
state that either is immutable or is discarded anyway – including both zones of the
heap and any existing values on the stacks. This leaves just a handful of variables,
such as the ZAM’s stack pointers and the code pointer.

3.7.4

Isolation

Fuzz must ensure that a microquery cannot interfere with the rest of the computation
in any way, other than contributing its return value. In the previous two sections, we
have already seen that the states of the ZAM runtime before and after a microquery
are logically equivalent, since any changes (other than the result value) are either
discarded or rolled back. To avoid direct timing interference between microqueries,
Fuzz also pads the runtime of the preemption code to ∆a + ∆d . However, Fuzz must
also avoid indirect timing interference through the garbage collector, or from the
rest of the system.
Fuzz prevents data-dependent invocations of the garbage collector by padding all
database rows to consume the same amount of memory, and by padding all database
objects to have the same number of rows. For databases that result from a split,
Fuzz adds an appropriate number of dummy rows that consume memory and computation time but do not contribute to the result. Fuzz also disables the garbage
collector during microqueries; if a microquery attempts to allocate more space than
is available in the young zone of the heap, Fuzz stops it and forces it to time out.
Thus, from the perspective of the macroquery (and the garbage collector), memory
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usage does not depend on un-noised values from the database.
To prevent page faults and context switches, Fuzz preallocates and pins all of its
memory pages, and it assigns itself a real-time scheduling priority. In our experiments, this was sufficient to control the timing variations to within a a few microseconds.

3.7.5

Implementation effort

Altogether, we added or modified 6,256 lines of code, including 4,887 lines of C++
for the typechecker/translator, 1,119 lines of C++ and Caml code for our implementation of predictable transactions, 186 lines of C++ for benchmarking support,
and 64 lines of Fuzz code for common library functions. For comparison, the entire
Caml Light codebase consists of 29,984 lines of code. This supports our claim that
Fuzz can be retrofitted into existing runtimes.

3.7.6

Limitations

Despite all our precautions, some potential sources of variability remain. For example, our current implementation does not freeze or flush the CPU’s caches (since
instructions like wbinvd are not available from user level), and it is designed to run
on a commodity Linux kernel. We believe that these sources would be difficult to
exploit because the adversary cannot control the memory layout or force the runtime to invoke system calls; also, any exploitable variation would have to be large
enough to cause the ∆a + ∆d padding to be overrun. An implementation with at least
some kernel support could remove some or all of these sources, and thus use a less
conservative padding.

3.8 Evaluation
Our evaluation has two primary goals. First, we need to demonstrate that Fuzz is
practical, in the sense that it is sufficiently fast and expressive to process realistic
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Name
kmeans
census
weblog

Type
Clustering
Aggregation
Histogram

LoC
119
50
45

Inspired by
(Blum et al., 2005)
(Chawla et al., 2005)
(Dwork et al., 2006b)

Table 3.3: Examples of non-adversarial Fuzz queries.
queries. Second, we need to demonstrate that our Fuzz implementation is effective,
i.e., that it prevents all the covert-channel attacks that are possible in our threat
model (Section 3.3.1).

3.8.1

Non-adversarial queries

To demonstrate that Fuzz is powerful enough to support useful queries, we implemented three example queries that were motivated in prior work (Dwork et al.,
2006b; Blum, Dwork, McSherry, and Nissim, 2005; Chawla, Dwork, McSherry,
Smith, and Wee, 2005). The weblog query is intended to run on the log of an
Apache web server; it computes a histogram of the number of web requests that
came from specific subnets. The kmeans query clusters a set of points and returns
the three cluster centers, and the census query runs on census data and reports the
income differential between men and women.
Table 3.3 reports the lines of code needed for each query. The queries are small
because programmers only need to specify the actual data processing; parsing and
I/O are handled by Fuzz. Also, the queries use a small library of generic primitives,
such as lists and a fold operator, that consists of 64 lines written directly in the Fuzz
language. Note that Fuzz can automatically certify queries as differentially private
and perform sensitivity analysis during typechecking, so even non-experts can easily
write differentially private queries.
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3.8.2

Experimental setup

To evaluate the performance and effectiveness of Fuzz, we performed experiments
using a setup consistent with our model from Section 3.3.1. We installed Fuzz
on a dedicated machine, a Dell Optiplex 780 with a 3.06 Ghz Intel Core 2 Duo
E7600 processor and 4 GB of memory. The machine was running a 32-bit Ubuntu
Linux 11.04 with a 2.6.38-8 kernel. For our timing measurements, we used the
CPU’s timestamp counter, which is cycle-accurate. To minimize interference, we
disabled CPU power management and the flush daemon, we kept all mutable data
in a ramdisk and mounted all other file systems read-only, and we terminated all
other processes on the machine, leaving Fuzz as the only running process (recall our
assumption that the machine is dedicated to Fuzz). As discussed in Section 3.7.6,
there are sources of timing variability that we could not disable, such as the periodic
timer interrupt, which takes about 3 µ s to handle in this setup, but these cannot be
influenced by an adversary, so they merely add noise to the query completion time
without leaking information. The padding time, which corresponds to ∆a + ∆d , was
set to 10 µ s; this setting was chosen to be the highest preemption latency we observed, plus a generous safety margin.
To estimate the overhead of our implementation, we also prepared a version of
the three translated Fuzz queries that can run on the original Caml Light runtime.
Since the original runtime does not support p-trans or a fixed-size memory representation for databases, this required small modifications to the Caml code; for
example, the modified queries invoke microqueries without any timeouts, and they
keep the database in ordinary Caml lists. These modifications do not affect the data
output of the queries. We used the modified Caml code only for experiments with
the original Caml Light runtime; all other experiments directly use the Caml code
that is output by the Fuzz front-end.
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Figure 3.5: Performance for non-adversarial queries.

3.8.3

Macrobenchmarks

To estimate the performance of Fuzz, we ran each of the example queries from Table 3.3 over a synthetic dataset and measured the query completion time. Using synthetic data rather than real private data does not affect our measurements because,
by design, the completion time does not depend on the contents of the database.
However, the data format was based on realistic data—specifically, the weblog input
was based on an Apache server log and the census input was based on U.S. census
data from (Hettich and Bay, 2015). The synthetic database in each case had 10,000
rows. We set the microquery timeouts for each map and split by first running the
query over example data with timeouts and padding disabled, measuring the maximum time taken by any of the map or split’s microqueries, and then setting the
timeout to be 10% above that. We verified that no timeouts occurred during our
measurements.
Figure 3.5 shows the query completion time for three different configurations:
the original Caml Light runtime, the Fuzz runtime with both timeouts and padding
disabled, and the Fuzz runtime with all features enabled. As expected, Fuzz takes
more time to complete the queries than the original runtime; for our three queries,
the slowdown was between 2.5x (census) and 6.8x (kmeans). However, in abso44
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Figure 3.6: Time spent in different phases of query processing.
lute terms, the completion times were not unreasonable: the most expensive query
(kmeans) took 12.7s to complete, which seems low enough to be practical.
Figure 3.5 also shows that, with timeouts and padding disabled, Fuzz’s performance is roughly comparable to that of the original Caml Light runtime. This is not
an apples-to-apples comparison; for example, the fixed-size memory representation
for databases costs performance, whereas erasing the young zone after each microquery is actually faster than garbage-collecting it. Nevertheless, the numbers suggest
that most of the overhead comes from padding and timeouts. Next, we examine this
in more detail.

3.8.4

Microbenchmarks

To get a better picture of what factors influence the performance of our implementation, we added instrumentation in such a way that query time can be attributed
to one of the following five phases:
• P1: Computation performed by a microquery;
• P2: Waiting for the preemption when a microquery completes early;
• P3: Preemption handling, storing results, restoring checkpoints, and loading
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the next row;
• P4: Padding the time of the preemption handler to ∆a + ∆d ; and
• P5: Computation performed by the macroquery.
Figure 3.6 shows our results (we omit the time P5 taken by the macroquery because
it was below 0.2% of the total for all queries). As already suggested by the previous
section, the majority of the time is spent in either the waiting or the padding phase.
This may seem rather conservative at first, but recall that the completion time of
even a non-adversarial microquery can vary with the row it is processing; the timeout
needs to be sufficient for the longest query with high probability. Timeout handling,
deallocation, checkpointing, and storing the results takes comparatively little time.
Note that the overhead for the kmeans query is considerably higher than for the
others. This is because kmeans repeatedly uses split to partition the database –
specifically, to map each point to the nearest of the three cluster centers. Since our
proof-of-concept implementation is not keeping track of the fact that the union of
the three partitions contains exactly the N rows in the original database, it must conservatively assume that each partition might contain all the N rows. Thus, functions
that operate on the partitions are padded to 3 · N times the timeout, when in fact N
times would be sufficient. This could be avoided by extending Fuzz with a suitable
operator, e.g., a GroupBy as in PINQ.

3.8.5

Adversarial queries

As explained in Section 3.5.4, Fuzz rules out state attacks and privacy budget attacks by design, and it prevents timing attacks by enforcing that each microquery
takes precisely the time specified by its timeout. This last point cannot be perfectly
achieved by a practical implementation running on real hardware; we need to quantify how close our implementation comes to this goal.
To this end, we implemented five adversarial queries, exploiting different variants
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Attack type
Memory allocation
Garbage creation
Artificial delay
Early termination
Artificial delay

Camllight runtime (unprotected)
Hit
Miss
|Hit−Miss|
1.961 s
0.317 s
1.644 s
1.567 s
0.318 s
1.249 s
1.621 s
0.318 s
1.303 s
26.378 s 26.384 s
0.006 s
2.168 s
0.897 s
1.271 s

Fuzz runtime (protected)
Hit
Miss
|Hit-Miss|
1.101 s
1.101 s
<1 µ s
1.101 s
1.101 s
<1 µ s
1.101 s
1.101 s
<1 µ s
1.101 s
1.101 s
<1 µ s
2.404 s
2.404 s
<1 µ s

Table 3.4: Effect of various attacks without and with predictable transactions. Each
adversarial query tries to vary its completion time based on whether some specific
individual is in the database. We show the total macroquery processing times when
the individual is present (hit) and absent (miss), as well as the differences.

Fraction of trials

100 %
80 %
60 %
40 %
Without padding
With padding

20 %

0%
-200 -150 -100 -50
0
50
100 150
Deviation from the median (microseconds)

200

Figure 3.7: Variation of completion time for the weblog-delay query.
of the attacks from Section 3.3 to try to vary the completion time based on whether
or not some specific individual is in the database:
• weblog-delay adds an artificial delay in each microquery that finds a match;
• weblog-term adds an artificial delay except when a microquery finds a match;
• weblog-mem consumes a lot of memory when a matching individual is found;
• weblog-gc creates a lot of garbage on the heap by repeatedly allocating and
releasing memory;
• census-delay looks for a particular known person in the database and adds a
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timing delay if their income is above a specified threshold.
We ran each query on two versions of the corresponding database: one that contains
the individual (Hit) and another that does not (Miss). To demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks on an unprotected system, we first performed the experiment
with Fuzz runtime and then repeated it with the original Caml Light runtime. This
gives us four configurations per query. We ran 100 trials for each configuration,
after a warm-up phase of two trials to ensure that the Fuzz binary and the database
were in the file system caches.
Figure 3.7 shows how the completion times varied across the 100 trials, using
the weblog-delay query with the Miss database as an example. With the original
runtime, the completion times varied by approximately ±150 µ s around the median.
With the Fuzz runtime, the completion times are extremely stable: the difference
between maximum and minimum was <1 µ s. The results for the other queries
were similar, indicating that Fuzz’s padding mechanism successfully masks internal
variations between trials. Hence, we only report median values here.
Table 3.4 shows our results for the different configurations. We make the following three observations. First, the attacks are very effective when protections are
disabled. For four out of the five queries, the completion times for the Hit cases
were at least one second different from the completion times for the Miss cases, so
an adversarial querier could easily have distinguished between the two cases and thus
learned with certainty whether or not the individual was in the database. We could
have achieved even higher differences simply by changing the queries. For weblogterm, the difference was only a few milliseconds; the reason is that, in order to change
the completion time of the query by one second through early termination, the adversary would have had to make each microquery take at least one second, so the
overall query would have taken a conspicuously long time – in this case, nearly three
hours.
Second, the attacks cease to be effective in Fuzz. In each case, the difference
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between Hit and Miss is so small we could not even reliably measure it locally on the
machine (for comparison, handling a timer interrupt requires about 3 µ s, and one
hundred of these are triggered every second, limiting the achievable accuracy), much
less across a wide-area network, using the small number of trials that the privacy
budget allows.
Third, the completion times are higher when protections are enabled. This is
consistent with our earlier observations from Section 3.8.3.

3.8.6

Summary

Our results show that Fuzz is effective: it eliminates state and budget channels by
design, and narrows the timing channel to a point where it ceases to be useful to
an adversary. Query completion times remain practical but are substantially higher
than in an unprotected system.

3.9 Related work on side and covert channel attacks
Floating Point attacks: Since the publication of Fuzz in 2010, there have been two
attacks that have subverted the Fuzz prototype’s privacy guarantees, and both exploit
flaws in the floating point computations done towards the end of processing a Fuzz
query that samples from the Laplace distribution.
The first work, Mironov (2012), broke the privacy guarantees of multiple systems, including PINQ, Airavat, and Fuzz, by exploiting the least significant bits of
the output result. Since the set of available floating point numbers are not uniformly
distributed between any two numbers, the standard algorithm for sampling from the
Laplace distribution (which all the systems including Fuzz used) has a skewed distribution of lower order bits in its result, which Mironov (2012) use to reveal some
private information. This leak is easily fixed by rounding up the final noised result
to a fixed level of precision determined in advance, on the same level of precision as
the unnoised query result.
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A second attack, Andrysco, Kohlbrenner, Mowery, Jhala, Lerner, and Shacham
(2015), exploits timing variations in the floating point operations when executed on
an x86 processor in the same final sampling step from the Laplace distribution, to reverse engineer the unnoised private answer. This attack only works under conditions
outside our threat model—the timing variation is so fine it requires the attacker to be
observing on the same machine, while we assume in Fuzz that the attacker is behind
a network. However, it can be completely closed by using predictable transactions
for the final post-processing step as well.
Differentially private systems: While there is a considerable body of work on
the theory of differential privacy (Dwork, 2006, 2008, 2009) and on differentially
private data analysis (McSherry, 2009; Roy et al., 2010), except for the papers on
Airavat (Roy et al., 2010) and PINQ (McSherry, 2009), none of these papers discuss
covert-channel attacks by adversarial queriers. The PINQ paper briefly mentions
certain security issues, such as exceptions and non-termination; Airavat discusses
timing channels, but, as we have shown in Section 3.3.5, its defense is not fully
effective. This chapter complements existing work by providing a practical defense
against covert-channel attacks, which could be applied to existing systems.
Covert channels: Covert channels have plagued systems for decades (Lampson,
1973; Wray, 1991), and they are notoriously hard to avoid in general. Fuzz is a
domain-specific solution; it only addresses differentially private query processing,
but it can give strong assurances in this specific setting.
A variety of defenses against covert channels have been suggested. Most related
to this chapter is the work on external timing channels. The bandwidth of external
timing channels can be reduced, e.g., by adding random delays (Kang et al., 1996;
Hu, 1991) or by time quantization (Askarov et al., 2010). However, to guarantee
differential privacy, the adversary must be prevented from learning even a single bit of
private information with certainty, so a mere reduction in bandwidth is not sufficient
in our setting. Fuzz avoids this problem by converting the timing channel into a
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storage channel, which in turn is handled by differential privacy.
Preventing timing channels seems hopeless in the general case. Language-based
designs can eliminate them for certain types of programs (Agat, 2000), but only at
the expense of severely limiting the expressiveness of the programming language.
Shroff and Smith (Shroff and Smith, 2008) show how to handle more general computations but may have to abort them, which can result in garbled data and/or leak
information through a storage channel. In the context of a differentially private
query, however, aborting individual microqueries is safe because the impact on the
overall result is known to be bounded by the sensitivity of the query. As shown
in Section 3.4.4, returning default values does not open a new storage channel or
increase the privacy cost of the query (though it may decrease its usefulness).
Side channels: Side channels can leak private information, e.g., through electromagnetic radiation (Gandolfi et al., 2001; Quisquater and Samyde, 2001) or power
consumption (Kocher et al., 1999). Many of these channels can only be exploited
if the adversary is physically close to the machine that executes the queries, which is
not permitted by our threat model.
Real-time systems: Some real-time systems have provisions for handling timer overrun problems in untrusted code, such as preemption or partial admission (Wilson,
Cytron, and Turner, 2009). In our scenario, it would not be sufficient to simply
preempt a microquery that has overshot its timeout—we must be able to terminate
it and clean up all of its side effects before the timeout expires. Another approach
is inferring the worst-case execution time (Wilhelm, Engblom, Ermedahl, Holsti,
Thesing, Whalley, Bernat, Ferdinand, Heckmann, Mitra, Mueller, Puaut, Puschner,
Staschulat, and Stenström, 2008), which is known to be difficult even for trusted
code.
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3.10 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that state-of-the-art systems for differentially private data
analysis are vulnerable to several different kinds of covert-channel attacks from adversarial queriers. Covert channels are particularly dangerous in this context because
the leakage of even a single bit of private, un-noised information completely destroys
the guarantees these systems are designed to provide. We analyzed the space of potential solutions, and we presented the design of Fuzz, which represents one specific
solution from this space and relies on default values and predictable transactions. Using a proof-of-concept implementation based on Caml Light, we demonstrated that
Fuzz can be retrofitted into an existing language runtime. Our evaluation shows that
Fuzz is practical and expressive enough to support realistic queries. Fuzz increases
query completion times compared to systems without covert-channel defenses, but
the increase does not seem large enough to prevent practical applications.
While we have demonstrated that Fuzz is safe against these sophisticated attacks,
it is not in general feasible to mathematically prove that a system is safe against all
classes of timing attacks. Indeed, the two successful attacks against Fuzz discussed in
Chapter 3.9 both worked due to our lack of protections in the final post-processing
step of sampling and adding Laplace noise to the calculated answer. Even stateof-the-art first principles verifications efforts, such as Hawblitzel, Howell, Lorch,
Narayan, Parno, Zhang, and Zill (2014) do not cover timing channel attacks, (although they would have ruled out the floating point attack from Mironov (2012)).
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4
Differentially Private Join Queries over
Distributed Databases

4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the problem of answering queries about private data that
is spread across multiple different databases. For instance, a medical researcher may
want to study a possible correlation between travel patterns and certain types of
illnesses. The necessary information exists today – e.g., in airline reservation djoinsystems and hospital records – but it is maintained by two separate companies who
are prevented by law from sharing this information with each other, or with a third
party. This separation prevents the processing of such queries, even if the final answer, e.g., a noised correlation coefficient, would be safe to release.

53

4.1.1

Motivation

Existing differential privacy query processors assume either that all the data is available in a single database—as in the previous chapter on Fuzz, or in McSherry (2009)
and Roy et al. (2010)—or that distributed queries can be broken into several subqueries that can each be answered using only one of the databases (Dwork et al.,
2006a; Rastogi and Nath, 2010; Chen et al., 2012; Götz and Nath, 2011). In
practice, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, suppose a medical researcher
wanted to study how a certain illness is correlated with travel to a particular region.
This data may be available, e.g., in a hospital database H and an airline reservation
system R, but to determine the correlation, it is necessary to join the two databases
together – for instance, we must count the individuals who have been treated for the
illness (according to H ) and have traveled to the region (according to R).
We are not aware of any existing method or query processor that can efficiently
support join queries with differential privacy guarantees. Joins cannot be broken into
smaller subqueries on individual databases because, in order to match up the same
persons’ data in the two databases, such queries would have to ask about individual
rows, which is exactly what differential privacy is designed to prevent. In principle,
one could process joins using secure multi-party computation (MPC) (Yao, 1982),
but MPC is only practical for small computational tasks, and differential privacy
only works well for large databases. The cost of an entire join under MPC would be
truly spectacular.
DJoin, the system we present in this chapter, is a solution to this problem. DJoin
can support SQL-style queries across multiple databases, including common forms
of joins. The key insight behind DJoin is that the distributed parts of many queries
can be expressed as intersections of sets or multisets. For instance, we can rewrite the
query from above to locally select all patients with the illness from H and all travelers
to the relevant region from R, then intersect the resulting sets, and finally count the
number of elements in the intersection. Not all SQL queries can be rewritten in this
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way, but many counting queries can: conjunctions and disjunctions of equality tests
directly correspond to unions and intersections of data elements. As we will show,
a number of additional operations, such as inequalities and numeric comparisons,
can be expressed in terms of multiset operations.
Protocols for private set operations have been studied by cryptographers for some
time (Vaidya and Clifton, 2005; Kissner and Song, 2005; Freedman, Nissim, and
Pinkas, 2004), but existing solutions compute exact set elements or exact cardinalities, which is not compatible with differential privacy. We present blinded, noised
private set intersection cardinality (BN-PSI-CA), an extension of the set-intersection
protocol from Kissner and Song (2005) that supports private noising, as well as
denoise-combine-renoise (DCR), an operator that can add or subtract multiple noised
subset cardinalities without compounding the corresponding noise terms. DCR relies on MPC to remove the noise terms on its inputs and to re-noise the output,
but DCR’s complexity grows with the number of parties and not with the number
of elements in the sets. For the queries we tried, this step never took more than 20
seconds.
We have implemented and evaluated a prototype of DJoin. Our results show
that the costs are substantial but typically feasible. For instance, the elements in a
simple two-way join on databases with 32,000 rows each can be evaluated in about
1.8 hours, with 83 MB of traffic, using a single commodity workstation for each
database. This is orders of magnitude faster than general MPC. DJoin’s cost is too
high for interactive use, but it seems practical for applications that can tolerate a
certain amount of latency, such as research studies. Our algorithms are easy to parallelize, so the speed could be improved by increasing the number of cores.
To summarize, this chapter makes the following four contributions:
• two new primitives, BN-PSI-CA and DCR, for distributed private query processing (Section 4.4);
• a query planner that rewrites SQL-style queries to take advantage of those two
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primitives (Section 4.5);
• the design of DJoin, an engine for distributed, differentially private queries
(Section 4.6); and
• an experimental evaluation of DJoin, based on a prototype implementation
(Section 4.7).

4.2 Related work on distributed private operations
Private set operations: The first protocols for private two-party set intersection
and set intersection cardinality were proposed by Freedman et al. Freedman et al.
(2004). Since then, a number of improvements have been proposed; for instance,
Kissner and Song (2005) extended the protocols to multiple parties, and Vaidya
and Clifton (2005) reduced the computational overhead. These protocols produce
exact results, and are thus not directly suitable for differential privacy. There are
specialized protocols for other private multi-party operations, e.g., for decision-tree
learning (Pinkas, 2002), and some of these have been adapted for differential privacy,
e.g., (Zhang, Li, and Lou, 2011).
Untrusted servers: Several existing systems enable clients to use an untrusted server
without exposing private information to that server. In SUNDR (Li, Krohn, Mazières, and Shasha, 2004), SPORC (Feldman, Zeller, Freedman, and Felten, 2010),
and Depot (Mahajan, Setty, Lee, Clement, Alvisi, Dahlin, and Walfish, 2010), the
server provides storage; in CryptDB (Popa, Redfield, Zeldovich, and Balakrishnan,
2011), it implements a database and SQL-style queries. This approach is complementary to ours: DJoin’s goal is to reveal some useful information about the data it
stores, but with an upper bound on how much can be learned about a single individual.
Query Optimization: Our approach does not take advantage of existing work on
database query optimizations: until and unless a particular optimization can be
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Query

Quentin

Charlie
Bob: Cancer
Doris: Malaria
Hank: Malaria
...

Carol
Doris: Abuja
Emil: Vegas
Frank: Seattle
...

Chris
Bob: Paris
Greg: Tokyo
Hank: Conakry
...

Figure 4.1: Motivating scenario. Charlie is a physician, and Carol and Chris are
travel agents. Quentin would like to know the correlation between treatment for
malaria and travel to high-risk areas.
proved differentially private. However, our approach has parallels to existing work in
database query planning. In particular, converting our JOIN queries into BN-PSICA subqueries is similar to a 2-phase semijoin execution (Mackert and Lohman,
1986), except that after the two subsets are identified, rather than sending them
across the network, we perform the BN-PSI-CA algorithm to privately compute the
cardinality.

4.3 Background and overview
4.3.1

Motivating scenario

Figure 4.1 shows our motivating scenario. Charlie, Carol, and Chris each have a
database with confidential information about individuals; for instance, Charlie could
be a physician, and Carol and Chris could be travel agents. We will refer to these
three as the curators. Quentin asks a question that combines data from each of the
databases; for instance, he might want to know the correlation between treatment
for malaria and travel to areas with a high risk of malaria infections. We will refer to
Quentin as the querier.
Our goal is to build a system that can give an (at least approximate) answer to
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Quentin’s question while offering strong privacy guarantee to the individuals whose
data is in the databases. In particular, we would like to establish an upper bound on
how much additional information any participant of the system (queriers or curators) can learn about any individual in the database. The word ‘additional’ is crucial
here, since the curators each have full access to their respective databases. For instance, since Charlie has treated Bob for cancer, our system cannot prevent him
from learning this fact, but it can prevent him from learning whether or not Bob has
recently traveled to Paris.

4.3.2

Challenge: Distribution

Answering differentially private queries over a single database is a well-studied problem, and several systems (McSherry, 2009; Roy et al., 2010), including Fuzz in the
previous chapter, are already available for this purpose. In principle, these systems
can also be used to answer queries across multiple databases, but this requires that
all curators turn over their data to a single trusted entity (e.g., one of the curators),
who evaluates the query on their behalf. However, there may not always be a single
entity that is sufficiently trusted by all the curators, so it seems useful to have an
alternative solution that does not require a trusted entity.
In some cases, distributed queries can be factored into several subqueries that
can each be executed on an individual database. For instance, a group of doctors
can count the number of male patients in their respective databases by counting the
number of patients in each database separately, and then add up the (individually
noised) results. This type of distributed query is supported by several existing systems (Dwork et al., 2006a; Rastogi and Nath, 2010; Chen et al., 2012; Shi, Chan,
Rieffel, Chow, and Song, 2011b; Götz and Nath, 2011). However, not all queries
can be factored in this way. For instance, the above approach will double-count
male patients that have been treated by more than one doctor, but a union query
(which would avoid this problem) cannot be expressed as a sum of counts. Similarly,
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any query that involves joining several databases (such as our motivating example)
cannot be expressed in this way.
Joins could be supported via general-purpose multi-party computation (MPC) (Yao,
1982), but the required runtimes would be gigantic: state-of-the-art MPC solutions,
such as FairplayMP (Ben-David, Nisan, and Pinkas, 2008), need about 10 seconds
to evaluate (very simple) functions that can be expressed with 1,024 logic gates.
Since the number of gates needed for a join would be at least quadratic in the number of input rows, and since differential privacy only works well for large databases,
this approach does not seem practical.

4.3.3

Approach

The key insight behind our solution is that joins are rarely used to compute full cross
products of different databases; rather, they are often used to ‘match up’ elements
from different databases. For instance, in our running example, we can first select
all the individuals in R who have traveled to the region of interest, then select all the
individuals in H who have been treated for the illness, and finally count the number
of individuals who appear in both sets. Thus, the problem of privately answering the
overall query is reduced to 1) some local operations on each database, and 2) privately
computing the cardinality of the intersection of multiple sets. Not all queries can be
decomposed in this way, but, as we will show in Section 4.5, there is a substantial
class of queries that can.
Protocols for private multiset operations (such as intersection and union) are
available (Vaidya and Clifton, 2005; Kissner and Song, 2005; Freedman et al., 2004),
but they tend to compute exact sets or set cardinalities. If we naïvely used these
algorithms, Charlie could compute the intersection of the set of the malaria patients
in his database with the sets of customers in Carol’s and Chris’ databases who have
traveled to high-risk areas, and then add noise in a collaborative fashion (Dwork
et al., 2006a). This would prevent Quentin from learning anything other than the
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(differentially private) output of the query — but Charlie could learn where his
patents have traveled, and Carol and Chris could learn which of their customers have
been treated for malaria. Hence, our first challenge is to extend these set-intersection
operations to support noising between the data curators.
A second challenge arises because some queries involve multiple set operations.
If Charlie simply added the two cardinalities together, the noise terms would compound, and thus (unnecessarily) degrade the quality of the overall result. To avoid
this problem, we need a way to de-noise, combine, and re-noise intermediate results
without compromising privacy.

4.4 Building blocks: BN-PSI-CA and DCR
Next, we describe two key building blocks that enable private processing of distributed queries. Each building block performs only one, very specific operation. In
Section 4.5, we will describe how these building blocks can be used in a larger query
plan to answer a variety of different queries.

4.4.1

Background: PSI-CA

Our first building block is related to a primitive called private set-intersection cardinality (PSI-CA), which allows a group of k curators with multisets S1 , . . . , Sk to privately compute |

∩

i Si |,

i.e., the (exact) number of elements they have in common,

but not the specific elements in

∩

i Si .

PSI-CA is a well-studied primitive (Freedman

et al., 2004; Kissner and Song, 2005; Vaidya and Clifton, 2005), albeit not in the
context of differential privacy. To explain the intuition, we describe one simple PSICA primitive (Freedman et al., 2004) for only two curators with simple sets in the
honest-but-curious (HbC) model. The primitive uses a homomorphic encryption
scheme that preserves addition and allows multiplication by a constant. Paillier’s
cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999) is an example of a scheme that has this property.
Suppose the two curators are C1 and C2 and their sets are S1 := {x1 , . . .} and
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S2 := {y1 , . . .}. C1 defines a polynomial P(z) over a finite field whose roots are his

set elements xi :
P(z) := (x1 − z)(x2 − z) · · · = ∑ αu zu
u

Next, C1 sends homomorphic encryptions of the coefficients αu to C2 , along with
the public key. For each element yi ∈ S2 , C2 then computes Enc(rP(yi ) + 0+ ), i.e.,
she evaluates the polynomial at each of her inputs, multiplies each result by a fresh
random number r, and finally adds a special string 0+ , e.g., a string of zeroes. Since
the cryptosystem is homomorphic, C2 can do this even though she does not know
C1 ’s private key. Finally, C2 sends a random permutation of the results back to C1 ,

who decrypts them and counts the occurrences of the special string 0+ , which is
∩

exactly | S1 S2 |.
At first glance, the cost of this algorithm appears to be quadratic: C2 must
compute Enc(rP(yi ) + 0+ ) for each of her | S2 | inputs, which involves computing
1|
u
Enc(P(yi )) along the way. If this is naïvely evaluated as Enc(∑|S
u=0 αu yi ), C2 must mul-

tiply

each

of

the

| S1 |

+

1

encrypted coefficients with an unencrypted constant (yui ), which requires an exponentiation each time, for a total of O(|S1 | · |S2 |) exponentiations. However,
Freedman et al. (2004) describes several optimizations that can reduce this overhead, including an application of Horner’s rule and the use of hashing to replace the
single high-degree polynomial with several low-degree polynomials. This reduces
the computational overhead to O(|S1 | + |S2 | ln ln |S1 |) exponentiations.

4.4.2

BN-PSI-CA: Two-party case

The basic PSI-CA primitive is not compatible with differential privacy because C1
∩

learns the exact, un-noised size of | S1 S2 |; moreover, each curator can learn the
size of the other curator’s set by observing the number of encrypted coefficients, or
encrypted return values, that are received from that curator. However, we can extend
the primitive to avoid both problems.
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First, we need to make the number of coefficients and return values independent
of the set sizes. We can do this by adding some extra elements that cannot appear
in either of the sets. As long as we can ensure that C1 and C2 are adding different
elements (e.g., by setting some bit to zero on C1 and to one on C2 ), this will not
affect the size of the intersection. In DJoin, we assume that a rough upper bound
on the size of each curator’s database is known, and we add enough elements to fill
up both sets to that upper bound.
Second, we need to add some noise n to the result that is revealed to C1 . We
observe that C2 can increase the apparent size of the intersection by n if she adds n
different1 encodings of the special string 0+ . However, to guarantee ε -differential
privacy, we would have to draw n from a Laplace distribution Lap(1/ε ), and this
would sometimes yield n < 0 – but C2 cannot remove encodings of 0+ because she
does not have C1 ’s private key, and thus cannot tell them apart from encodings of
other values. Instead, we require C2 to draw n from X2 + Lap(1/ε ) and we cut n at 0
and 2 · X2 ; thus, C2 can add n encodings of 0+ and 2 · X2 − n encodings of a random
value to keep the overall size independent of n. (Cutting the Laplace distribution can
leak a small amount of information when the extremal values are drawn, and thus
changes the privacy guarantee to (ε , δ )-differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006a);
however, by increasing X2 , we can make δ arbitrarily small, at the expense of a higher
overhead.) We call the resulting primitive blinded noised PSI-CA (BN-PSI-CA).
Note that at the end, C2 knows the noise term n and C1 the noised cardinality

| S1

∩

S2 | + n. Thus, if the latter is used in further computations, we have an oppor-

tunity to remove the noise again, as long as we can ensure that neither curator learns
both values. This prevents the noise terms from compounding, and it enables us to
use a very high noise level (and thus a low value of ε ) because the noise will not affect
the final result.
1 The

Paillier cryptosystem can construct many different ciphertexts for the same plaintext.

62

4.4.3

BN-PSI-CA: Multi-party case

Since Freedman’s initial work, cryptographers have considerably extended the range
of private multiset operations. For instance, the protocol by Kissner and Song (2005)
also supports set unions, as well as set intersections with more than two parties, and
it is compositional: the result of a set union or set intersection can be unioned or intersected with further sets, without decrypting it first. Kissner and Song (2005) can
evaluate any function on multisets that can be described by the following grammar:
ϒ ::= s | ϒ ∩ ϒ | s ∪ ϒ | ϒ ∪ s

where s is a multiset that is known to some curator Ci .
The protocol from (Kissner and Song, 2005) computes |

∩

i=1,...,k Si |

as follows.

First, the k curators use a homomorphic threshold cryptosystem to share a secret key
sk amongst themselves, while the corresponding public key pk is known to all cura-

tors. Each curator Ci now encrypts a polynomial Pi whose roots are the elements of
its local set Si . The encrypted polynomials are then essentially added together, yielding a polynomial P whose roots are the elements in the intersection. Each curator
Ci now evaluates P on the elements ei j of his local set Si , yielding values vi j := P(ei j );

however, recall that, because sk is shared, no individual curator can decrypt the vi j .
The curators then securely re-randomize and shuffle (Neff, 2001) the vi j , such that
each curator learns all the vi j but cannot tell which curator it came from. Finally,
the curators jointly decrypt the vi j . If there are n elements in the intersection, this
yields n · k zeroes; hence, each curator can compute the final result by dividing the
number of zeroes by k.
We can use the same blinding technique as in Section 4.4.2 to construct a multiparty version of BN-PSI-CA. After computing the vi j , but before the shuffle, each
curator draws a noise term ni as above and adds 2 · Xi extra values, ni of which are 0+ .
As above, this adds ∑i ni to the resulting cardinality, but the noise can be removed
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again via DCR, which we discuss next.

4.4.4

DCR: Adding cardinalities

BN-PSI-CA is sufficient to answer queries that require a single distributed multiset
operation. However, in Section 4.5.2 we will see that some queries require multiple
operations, and that the result is then a linear combination of the different cardinalities. In principle, we could designate a single curator C that collects all cardinalities
and computes the overall result; however, this would a) compound all the noise
terms and thus decrease the quality of the result, and b) reveal all the intermediate
results to C and thus (unnecessarily) reveal some private information.
Instead, we can combine the various cardinalities using secure multi-party computation (MPC) (Yao, 1982). If we have a number of players with private inputs
xi that are each known to only one of the players, MPC allows the players to col-

lectively compute a function f (x1 , x2 , . . .) without revealing the inputs to each other.
Even after decades of research, MPC remains impractical for complex functions or
large inputs, but modern implementations, such as (Ben-David et al., 2008), can
process simple functions in a few seconds or less. Thus, while MPC may be too
expensive to evaluate the entire query, we can certainly use it to combine a small
number of subquery results.

∩

∩

For instance, suppose the query is for |S1 S2 | + |S3 S4 |, and that there are four
curators involved: C1 and C3 learn the noised results R1 and R2 for the first and the
second term, respectively, and C2 and C4 learn the corresponding noise terms n1 and
n2 . Then we can compute the query result under MPC as
q = R1 + R2 − (n1 + n2 ) + N

where each of the four curators contributes one of the private inputs Ri and ni , and
N is a new, global noise term. Next, we describe how N is computed.
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From
R1 Local sel.
R2 Disjunction

σP(X)∧Q (X ▷◁ Y )
σP ∨ Q (X ▷◁ Y )

R3 Split

|σX.a=Y.b∧(P(X)∨Q(Y )) (X ▷◁Y )|

R4 Union
R5 Not equal

|X Y |
|σX.a=Y.b∧X.c̸=Y.d (X ▷◁ Y )|

To

σQ (σP (X) ▷◁ Y )
∪
σP (X ▷◁ Y ) σQ (X ▷◁ Y )
|σX.a=Y.b (σP (X) ▷◁ Y )|+
|σX.a=Y.b (σ¬P (X) ▷◁ σQ (Y ))|
∩
|X| + |Y | − |X Y |
|σX.a=Y.b (X ▷◁ Y )| − |σX.a=Y.b ∧ X.c=Y.d (X∩▷◁ Y )|
∑i=0..k−1 |πa || pre(c,i) (σbit(c,i)=1 (X))

∪

R6 Comparison |σX.a=Y.b ∧ X.c>Y.d (X ▷◁ Y )|
R7 Equality
R8 Join

πb || pre(d,i) (σbit(d,i)=0 (Y ))|

|σX.a=Y.b ∧ X.c=Y.d (X ▷◁ Y )|

|σ(X.a|| pad ||X.c)=(Y.b|| pad ||Y.d) (X ▷◁ Y )|
∩

|σX.a=Y.b (X ▷◁ Y )|

|πa (X) πb (Y )|

Table 4.1: DJoin’s rewrite rules. These rules are used to transform a query (written in
the language from Figure 4.2) into the intermediate query language from Figure 4.4,
which can be executed natively.

4.4.5

DCR: Cooperative noising

MPC enables us to safely remove the noise that was added to the individual cardinalities by BN-PSI-CA, but we must add back a sufficient amount of noise N as part
of the MPC, i.e., before the result is revealed. To prevent information leakage, the
new noise N must be such that no individual curator can control it or predict its
value.
We follow the algorithm in Dwork et al. (2006a) to generate the noise N , with
some implementation modifications. Each curator chooses a random bitstring vi
uniformly at random and contributes it as an input to the MPC. The MPC computes v := v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ · · · . As long as a curator honestly chooses vi uniformly at random
and does not share this with any other party, she can be certain that no other curator can know anything else about the computed noise string v, even if every single
other curator colludes. Finally, the MPC uses the fundamental transformation law
of probabilities to change the distribution of v to a Laplace distribution Lap(1/ε ).
This yields the noise term N , which is then added to the query result. We call this
primitive denoise-combine-renoise (DCR).
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:= SELECT output FROM union
WHERE predicate
output
:= NOISY COUNT(field)
union
:= rows | union UNION ALL rows
rows
:= join | subquery
join
:= db{,db}∗
subquery := SELECT fields FROM join
WHERE predicate
predicate := term | predicate OR term |
predicate AND term
term
:= val = val | val != val |
val < val
val
:= number | string | db.field

query

Figure 4.2: DJoin’s query language.

4.5 Distributed query processing
So far, we have described BN-PSI-CA, which can compute differentially private set
intersection cardinalities, and DCR, which can privately combine multiple cardinalities. Next, we describe how DJoin integrates these two primitives into larger query
plans that can answer SQL-style queries.

4.5.1

Query language: SPJU

For ease of presentation, we describe our approach using the simple query language
in Figure 4.2, which consists of SQL-style operators for selection, projection, a cross
join, and union (SPJU). This query language is obviously much simpler than SQL
itself, but it is rich enough to capture many interesting distributed operations. We
note that many of the missing features of SQL can easily be added back, as long as
queries do not use them to access more than one database at a time.
Each query in our language can be translated into relational algebra, specifically,
∪

in a combination of selections (σ ), projections (π ), joins (▷◁), unions ( ), and counts
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DCR

|⋅|
−

∪
|∩|

πssn

σA.diag='malaria'

|∩|

πssn

πid

|∩|

πid

πssn,id

σdiag='malaria'

A

B

A

(a) Original plan

B

πssn,id

Loccal operations

σA.id=B.id
A id B id

BNPSICA

σA.ssn=B.ssn
A
B

+

(b) Rewritten for DJoin

Figure 4.3: Query example. The original plan (left) cannot be executed without
compromising privacy. The rewritten plan (right) consists of three tiers: a local tier,
a BN-PSI-CA tier, and a DCR tier.
(| · |). For instance, the query
SELECT COUNT(A.id) FROM A,B
WHERE (A.ssn=B.ssn OR A.id=B.id)
AND A.diagnosis='malaria'

could be written (with abbreviations) as:
| σ(A.ssn=B.ssn ∨ A.id=B.id) ∧ A.diag=”malaria” (A ▷◁ B) |

Figure 4.3(a) shows a graphical illustration of this query.

4.5.2

Query rewriting

Most distributed queries cannot be executed natively by DJoin because they contain
operators (such as ▷◁ or <) that our system cannot support. Therefore, such queries
must be transformed into other queries that are semantically equivalent but contain
only operators that our system can support, which are a) any SQL queries on a single
database that produce a noisy count or a multiset; b) BN-PSI-CA; and c) DCR.
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query
cardex
setex
sigmaex

:= cardex | cardex + cardex |
cardex - cardex
:= |setex ∩ setex {∩ setex}∗ |
:= πfields (sigmaex) | sigmaex
:= σlocal_predicate (db) | db

Figure 4.4: DJoin’s intermediate language.
Figure 4.4 shows the language that can be supported natively. DJoin uses a number
of rewrite rules to perform this transformation. The most interesting rules are shown
in Table 4.1; some trivial rules, e.g., for transforming boolean predicates, have been
omitted.
Local selects: We try to perform as many operations as possible locally at each
database, e.g., via rule R1 for selects that involve only columns from one database.
Disjunctions: We use basic boolean transformations to move any disjunctions in
the join predicates to the outermost level, where they can be replaced by set unions
using rule R2, or split off using rule R3.
Unions: Rule R4 (which is basically De Morgan’s law) replaces all the set unions
with additions, subtractions, and set intersections.
Inequalities: Rule R5 replaces the ̸= operators with an equality test and a subtraction; rule R6 encodes integer comparisons as a sum of equalities. Both rules assume
that there is a nearby equality test for matching rows.
Equalities: Once all non-local operations in the join predicates are conjunctions of
equality tests, we can use rule R7 to reduce these to a single equality test, simply by
concatenating the relevant columns in each database (with appropriate padding to
separate columns).
Joins: Once a join cardinality has only one equality test left, rule R8 replaces it with
an intersection cardinality.
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4.5.3

Result: Three-tier query plan

If the rewriting process has completed successfully, the rewritten query should now
conform to our intermediate language from Figure 4.4, which implies a three-tier
structure: the first tier (sigmaex and setex) consists of local selections and projections that involve only a single database; the second tier (cardex) consists of set
intersection cardinalities, and the third tier (query) consists of arithmetic operations
applied to cardinalities. We refer to the rewritten query as a query plan. Figure 4.3(b)
shows a query plan for the query from Figure 4.3(a) as an illustration.
A query plan with this three-tier structure can be executed in a privacy-preserving
way. The first tier can be evaluated using classical database operations on the individual databases; the second tier can be evaluated using BN-PSI-CA (Section 4.4.2
and 4.4.3), and the third tier can be evaluated using DCR (Section 4.4.4 and 4.4.5).

4.5.4

Limitations

DJoin has only two distributed operators: BN-PSI-CA and DCR. If a query cannot
be rewritten into a query plan that uses only those operators (and some purely local
ones), it cannot be supported by DJoin. For instance, DJoin currently cannot process
the query
SELECT COUNT(A.id) FROM A,B,C
WHERE ((A.x*B.y)<C.z)

because we know of no efficient way to rewrite the predicate into set intersections.
Rewriting is generally difficult for predicates that involve computations across fields
from multiple databases. The predicates DJoin can support include 1) predicates that
use only fields from a single database, 2) equality tests between fields from different
databases, and 3) conjunctions and disjunctions of such predicates. In addition,
DJoin supports operators for which it has an explicit rewrite rule, such as inequalities
and numeric comparisons (rules R5 and R6). We do not claim that we have found
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all possible rewrite rules; if rules for additional operators are discovered, DJoin could
be extended to support them as well.
DJoin is currently limited to counting queries: it does not support sum queries,
or queries with non-numeric results. Differential privacy can in principle support
such queries, e.g., via the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007), but
we have not yet found a way to express them in terms of set intersections.

4.6 DJoin design
In this section, we present the design of DJoin, our system for processing distributed
differentially-private queries using the mechanisms explained so far.

4.6.1

Assumptions

Our design is based on the following assumptions:
1. All queriers know the schema and a rough upper bound on the total size of
each curator’s database.
2. The curators are “honest but curious”, i.e., they will learn whatever information
they can, but they will not deviate from the protocol.
3. Each curator has a “privacy budget” that represents to amount of private information he or she is willing to release through queries.
4. The curators can authenticate each querier.
Assumption 1 is necessary to make BN-PSI-CA and query planning work. Assumption 2 is not inherent (PSI-CA can work in an adversarial model (Kissner and Song,
2005)) but helps with efficiency and does not seem unreasonable in practice. Assumption 3 is common for differentially private query processors (McSherry, 2009;
Roy et al., 2010), and as in Fuzz in Chapter 3. and assumption 4 can be satisfied,
e.g., using cryptographic signatures.
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4.6.2

Overview and roadmap

DJoin consists of a number of servers, which run on the curators’ machines, as well
as at least one client, which runs the querier’s machine and communicates with the
servers to execute queries. Each server has a privacy budget (Section 4.6.3) and a
local database with a schema (Section 4.6.4) that is known to all clients and servers.
Users can interact with DJoin by issuing a query q and a requested accuracy
level ν to their local client. (ν is the parameter of the Laplace distribution from
which DCR will draw the final noise term.) The user’s client attempts to rewrite
the query according to the rules from Section 4.5.2. If this succeeds, the result
is a different query q′ that is equivalent to q but can be executed entirely with local
queries, BN-PSI-CA, and DCR. The client then submits the query to the servers, and
each server performs an analysis (Section 4.6.5) to determine the sensitivity S(q, dbi )
of the query q in that server’s local data dbi . In combination with the accuracy level
ν , the sensitivity yields the privacy cost εi that this server will incur for answering

the query.
Next, the client then uses a distributed commit protocol (Section 4.6.6) to assign
an identifier to the query and to ensure that all the servers agree which query is being
executed. Once the query is committed, the servers execute the query in three stages
(Section 4.6.7): first, each server completes any subqueries that involve only its local
database; next, the servers jointly complete each of the BN-PSI-CA operations; and
finally, the servers execute DCR to combine and re-noise their results. The overall
result is then revealed to the client.

4.6.3

Privacy budget

Each server maintains three pieces of local information: A local database, a privacy
budget, and a table of pending queries, which is initially empty.
The privacy budget is essentially an upper bound on the amount of private information about any individual that the curator owning the server is willing to release
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through answering queries. It is well known (Dwork, 2006) that, if q1 and q2 are two
queries that are ε1 - and ε2 -differentially private, respectively, the sequential composition of both is (ε1 + ε2 )-differentially private. Because of this, servers can simply
deduct each query’s “privacy cost” from the budget separately, without having to
remember previous queries. A similar construction is used in other differentially
private query processors, including PINQ (McSherry, 2009), Airavat (Roy et al.,
2010), and the Fuzz system we described in Chapter 3. In the appendix to this
chapter, we briefly sketch a possible approach to choosing the privacy budget.
Recall from Section 4.4 that DJoin must charge the privacy budget both for intermediate results from BN-PSI-CA operations and for the final result that is revealed
by DCR. To avoid confusion, we use the symbol ε p to denote the cost of a BN-PSICA operation and εr to denote the cost of the final result. The total cost of a query
with several BN-PSI-CAs is thus εr + ∑ j ε p, j .

4.6.4

Schemata and multiplicities

The local database is a relational database that can be maintained in a classical, nondistributed DBMS, e.g., mySQL. For simplicity, we will assume that the data from
each individual user is collected in a single row of the database; if this is not the case
already, a normalization step (e.g., a GROUP BY) must be performed first. The database
schema may assign an arbitrary type τ (c) to each column c; however, to make our
sensitivity analysis work, we additionally allow each column to be annotated with
a multiplicity m(c) that indicates how often any individual value can appear in that
column (for instance, m(c) = 1 indicates a column of unique keys). If no annotation
is present, DJoin assumes m(c) = ∞.
Multiplicities are important to determine an upper bound on sensitivity of a
query. Recall from Chapter 2 that the sensitivity S(q, dbi ) of a counting query q in
a database dbi is the largest number of rows that a change to a single row in D can
cause to be added or removed from the result of q. For instance, consider the query
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SELECT COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B
WHERE A.x=B.y

If the multiplicities are m(A.x) = 3 and m(B.y) = 5, then a change to a single row in A
can add at most five rows to the result – hence, whatever the new value of A.x is, we
know that B can contain at most five rows whose y-column matches that value. (The
argument for disappearing rows is analogous.) Conversely, the query’s sensitivity in
B is three because at most three rows in A can have the value B.y in column x. Note

that processing such queries as intersections requires an extra encoding step; see the
appendix for details.
Clearly, the use of a column with unbounded multiplicity can cause the sensitivity
to become unbounded as well. However, it is safe to use such columns in conjunction
with others; for instance, the query
SELECT COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B
WHERE A.x=B.y AND A.p=B.q

has sensitivity 5 in A even if m(A.p) = m(B.q) = ∞.
It may seem tempting to let DJoin choose the multiplicity itself, based on how
often elements actually occur in the database. However, this would create a side
channel: queriers could learn private facts about the database by observing, e.g., how
much is deducted from the privacy budget after running certain queries. To avoid
this problem, DJoin follows the approach from Fuzz and determines the multiplicity
statically, without looking at the data.

4.6.5

Sensitivity analysis

We now describe how to infer the sensitivity of more complex queries, and specifically on the question how much the number of rows output by a query σpred (db1 ▷◁
· · · ▷◁ dbk ) can change if a single row in one of the dbi is changed.

To explain the intuition behind our analysis, we begin with a few simple examples:
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1. A ▷◁ B ▷◁ C
2. σA.x=B.y (A ▷◁ B ▷◁ C)
3. σA.x=B.y∧ B.y=C.z (A ▷◁ B ▷◁ C)
4. σA.x=B.y∧ A.p=B.q (A ▷◁ B ▷◁ C)
5. σA.x=B.y∧ B.y=C.z∧ A.x=C.q (A ▷◁ B ▷◁ C)
Since query (1) has no predicates, its sensitivity in A is simply |B| · |C|. The addition
of the constraint A.x = B.y changes the sensitivity to m(B.y) · |C|, since each row in A
can now join with at most m(B.y) rows in B; similarly, adding B.y = C.z in query (3)
reduces the sensitivity to m(B.y) · m(C.z). When there is a conjunction of multiple
constraints between the same databases, the most selective one ‘wins’; hence, the
sensitivity of query (4) is min(m(B.y), m(B.q)) · |C|. When there are multiple ‘join
paths’, the most restrictive one wins. For instance, in query (5), the third constraint
reduces the sensitivity in A only if m(C.q) < m(B.y) · m(C.z); otherwise, the sensitivity
is the same as for query (3).
To solve this problem in the general case, we adapt a classical algorithm from the
database literature (Krishnamurthy, Boral, and Zaniolo, 1986) that was originally
intended for query optimization in the presence of joins. This algorithm builds a
join graph G that contains a vertex for each database that participates in the join,
and a directed edge between each pair (db1 , db2 ) of vertices that is initially annotated
with |db2 |, the size of the database db2 . We then consider each of the predicates
in turn and update the edges. Specifically, for each predicate dbi . f1 = db j . f2 with
dbi ̸= db j , we change the annotation wi, j on the edge (dbi , db j ) to min(wi, j , m(db j . f2 ))

and, correspondingly, the annotation w j,i on (db j , dbi ) to min(w j,i , m(dbi . f1 )). Then
we can obtain an upper bound on the sensitivity S(q, dbi ) of q in some database dbi
by finding the min-cost spanning tree that is rooted at dbi , using the product of the
edge annotations as the cost function.
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If the predicate contains disjunctions, we can rewrite it into DNF and then add
∪

up the sensitivity bounds. This is sound because σ p∨q (X) = σ p (X) σq (X). If a row
is removed from X and the sensitivities of p and q are s p and sq , this can change
the cardinalities of the two sets by at most s p and sq , and thus the cardinality of the
union by at most s p + sq . The same approach also works for unions of subqueries.

4.6.6

Distributed commit

Next, we describe how the client submits the query to the servers. It is important
to ensure that the servers agree on which query they are executing; without this, a
malicious client could trick a server into believing that it is executing a low-sensitivity
query, and thus cause an insufficient amount of noise to be added to the result. Note
that there is no need to agree on an ordering because all queries are read-only.
When the client accepts a query q with requested noise level ν from the user, it
first calculates the sensitivity of q and the corresponding ε ; then it tries to rewrite q
into an equivalent query q′ that uses only the language from Figure 4.4. If this succeeds, the client chooses a random identifier I and sends a signed prepare(I, q, q′ , ν )
message to each server. What follows is essentially a variant of the classical two-phase
commit protocol.
Upon receiving the prepare message, the server at each Ci verifies that q can be
rewritten into q′ , and that it does not already have a pending query with identifier
I . If either test fails, the server responds with a nak immediately. Otherwise, Ci ’s

server calculates its privacy cost εi := εr,i + ∑ j ε p,i j that it would incur by executing its
part of q′ . This cost consists of the base cost εr,i := S(q, dbi )/ν , which depends on the
query’s sensitivity in Ci ’s local data, and an additional charge ε p,i j for each PSI-CA
operation that Ci must participate in to execute q′ . If Ci ’s privacy budget can cover εi ,
its server deducts εi from the budget, adds (I, q′ , ν , εi ) to its pending table, and sends
a signed response ack(I , q, q′ , ν ) back to the client. Otherwise, the server responds
with a nak. This might occur, for instance, if the sensitivity of q is too high or the
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requested noise level ν is too low.
If the client receives at least one nak, it sends a signed abort(I) message to each
server that has responded with an ack, which causes the reserved parts of the privacy
budget to be released. Otherwise the client combines the received ack messages to
form a certificate Γ, and it sends commit(I, Γ) to the servers. The servers verify that
all required acks are present; if so, they begin executing the query.

4.6.7

Query execution

Each query is executed in three stages. First, upon receiving the commit message,
the server at each Ci computes the parts of the query that require only data from its
local database dbi . For some queries, this will yield part of the result directly (e.g.,
∪

in |σx=0 (A) σx=1 (B)|), but more typically the first stage will produce a number of
sets on each server that will be used as inputs in the second stage.
The second stage consists of a number of BN-PSI-CA instances. Since all servers
agree on the query q′ , each server can independently determine which BN-PSI-CA
instances it should be involved in, and what role in the protocol it should play in
each instance. Ties are broken deterministically, and the instances are numbered in
order to distinguish different instances that involve the same set of servers. At the
end of the second stage, each server has learned a number of noised results and/or
noise terms, which are used as inputs to the third stage.
The third stage consists of an invocation of DCR, which de-noises the results
from the second stage, combines them as required by q′ , and then re-noises the
combined result using the protocol from Section 4.4.4. Recall that the re-noising
requires an additional input from each server that must be chosen uniformly at random. At the end of the third stage, each server learns the result of the multi-party
computation and forwards it back to the client, which displays it to the user.
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4.7 Evaluation
In this section, we report results from an experimental evaluation of DJoin. Our goal
is to show that 1) DJoin is powerful enough to support useful queries; and that 2)
DJoin’s communication and computation overheads are low enough to be practical.

4.7.1

Prototype implementation

We have built a prototype implementation of DJoin for our experiments. Our
prototype uses mySQL to store each curator’s data and to execute the purely local parts of each query, and it relies on FairplayMP (Ben-David et al., 2008) to
execute the secure multi-party computation. We implemented the two-party BNPSI-CA primitive from Section 4.4.2, based on the thep library (THEP) for the
Paillier cryptosystem. Our implementation includes the optimizations from (Freedman et al., 2004) that were already briefly described in Section 4.4.1, including the
use of bucket hashing to replace the single high-degree polynomial P with a number
of lower-degree polynomials. This reduces BN-PSI-CA’s O(|S1 | · |S2 |) time complexity to O(|S1 | + |S2 | ln ln |S1 |) and makes it highly parallelizable, with synchronization
required only for the few elements that hash to the same bucket. Our prototype
also supports multi-party BN-PSI-CA based on the protocol from Kissner and Song
(2005) and the UTD Paillier Threshold Encryption Toolbox (Garrity and Kantarcioglu, 2012), but we do not include multi-party results here due to lack of space.
We also built a query planner that implements the rewrite rules from Section 4.5.2, as well as a backend for FairplayMP that outputs code for DCR (Section 4.4.5). To our knowledge, DCR is the first implementation of the shared noise
generation algorithm described in Dwork et al. (2006a). Altogether, our prototype
consists of 3,560 lines of Java code for the runtime engine, 249 lines of code in
FairplayMP’s custom language for the DCR primitive, and 6,776 lines of C++ code
for the query planner.
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Query
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

#PSI-CA

SELECT NOISY COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B WHERE A.x=B.y
∩
| (πx (A) πy (B)) |
SELECT NOISY COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B WHERE A.x=B.x
AND (A.y!=B.y)
∩
∩
| (πx (A) πx (B)) | − | (πx,y (A) πx,y (B)) |
SELECT NOISY COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B WHERE A.x=B.y
AND (A.z="x" OR B.p="y")
∩
∩
| (πx (A) πy (σ p=”y” (B))) | + | (πx (σz=”x” (A)) πy (σ p̸=”y” (B))) |
SELECT NOISY COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B WHERE A.x=B.x OR A.y=B.y
∩
∩
∩
| (πx (A) πx (B)) | + | (πy (A) πy (B)) | − | (πx,y (A) πx,y (B)) |
SELECT NOISY COUNT(A.x) FROM A,B WHERE A.x LIKE "%xyz%"
AND A.w=B.w AND (B.y+B.z>10) AND (A.y>B.y)
∩
∑i=0..7 | (πw,(y>>i+1) (σ(x like ’%xyz%’)∧(y&2i = 1) (A))

1
2
2
3
8

πw,(y>>i+1) (σ((y+z)>10)∧(y&2i =0) (B))) |

Table 4.2: Example queries and the corresponding query plans. The number of
BN-PSI-CA operations, which is a rough measure for the complexity of the query,
is shown on the right.

4.7.2

Experimental setup

For our experiments, we used five Dell PowerEdge R410 machines, each with a
Xeon E5530 2.4 GHz CPU, 12 GB of memory, and four 250 GB SATA disks.
The machines were connected by Gbit Ethernet. Following the recommendations
in Bethencourt, Song, and Waters (2006), we used 1,024-bit keys for the Paillier
cryptosystem. We chose εr = 0.0212 to ensure that the noise for a query with sensitivity s = 1 is within ±100 with probability 95%; we set ε p = 1/8 · εr , and we chose
δ = 1/N = 6.67 · 10−5 .

Our experiments use synthetic data rather than ‘real’ confidential data because
our cryptographic primitives operate on hashes of the data anyway, so the actual content has no influence on the overall performance. Therefore, we generated synthetic
databases. Each database had N = 15, 000 rows.
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Figure 4.5: Computation time for PSI-CA. The time is approximately linear in the
number of set elements.

4.7.3

Microbenchmarks: BN-PSI-CA

First, we quantified the cost of our two main cryptographic primitives. To measure
the cost of BN-PSI-CA, we generated two random sets with N elements each, and we
ran two-party BN-PSI-CA on them, varying N between 1,000 and 32,000 elements.
We measured the computation time on each party and the amount of traffic that was
exchanged between the two parties.
Figure 4.5 shows the time taken by the servers at C1 and C2 , respectively, to execute
BN-PSI-CA using a single core. The time increases almost linearly with the size
of the sets; recall from Section 4.7.1 that the optimizations we applied reduce the
computational overhead to O(|S1 | + |S2 | ln ln |S1 |). Note that the two servers cannot
run in parallel; the total runtime is the sum of the two servers’ runtimes. Most of
the computation is performed by C1 : 49% of the total time was spent constructing
the polynomials at C1 ; 29% of the time was spent evaluating the polynomials at C2 ;
and the remaining 21% were spent decrypting the resulting evaluations at C1 .
Figure 4.6 shows the total amount of traffic sent by C1 and C2 . The traffic is
roughly proportional to the set sizes. For large sets, approximately 70% of the traffic consists of polynomials sent from C1 to C2 , and the remaining 30% consists of
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Figure 4.6: Network traffic sent by the two parties in a BN-PSI-CA run.
evaluation results sent back to C1 for decryption.
To quantify BN-PSI-CA’s scalability in the number of cores, we performed a
15,000-element intersection with one, two, and four cores. (This was done on a
different machine with a 2.67 GHz Intel X3450 CPU, since our E5530s have only
two cores.) The additional cores resulted in speedups of 1.99 and 3.98, respectively.
This is expected because BN-PSI-CA is trivially scalable: encryptions, polynomial
construction, evaluations, and decryptions can all proceed in parallel on multiple
cores, or even multiple machines. Thus, DJoin should be able to handle databases
much larger than 32, 000 elements, as long as the computation can be spread over a
sufficient number of machines.

4.7.4

Microbenchmarks: DCR

Next, we quantified the cost of the DCR operator. Recall from Section 4.4.4 that
DCR internally consists of two stages: first, the inputs (cardinalities and inverted
noise terms) from the various servers are added together, and then a new noise term
is drawn from a Laplace distribution and added to the result. To separate the two
stages, we measured the time to execute DCR twice, with and without the second
stage, and we varied the number of parties from two to four.
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Figure 4.7: Computation time for DCR with and without the renoising step.
Figure 4.7 shows our results. The times grow superlinearly with the number of
parties ((Ben-David et al., 2008) reports a quadratic dependency) but are all below
20 seconds. Although MPC is generally expensive, DJoin performs most of its work
using a specialized primitive (BN-PSI-CA), so the functionality that remains for
DCR to perform is fairly simple. Note that neither the size nor the number of sets
affect DCR’s runtime because each server inputs just a single number: the sum of
all the cardinalities and noise terms it has computed.

4.7.5

Example queries

To demonstrate that DJoin can execute nontrivial and potentially useful queries, we
chose five example queries, which are shown in Table 4.2 along with the query plan
they are rewritten into. Each query illustrates a different aspect of DJoin’s capabilities:
• Q1 is an example of a basic join between two databases, which is transformed
into a PSI-CA using rule R8.
• Q2 adds an inequality, which is rewritten as a difference between two intersections via rule R5.
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• Q3 contains a disjunction with two local predicates, which can be split using
rule R3.
• Q4 contains another disjunction, but with remote predicates; this is rewritten
via rule R2.
• Q5 contains an equality and a numeric comparison between columns in different databases, which can be split via rule R6, as well as several other predicates
that can be evaluated locally.
For Q5, the y column in both databases contained numbers between 0 and 255. The
table also shows the number of BN-PSI-CA operations in each query plan, which
(in conjunction with the set sizes) is a rough measure of the effort it takes to evaluate
it. The more complex a query is, the more BN-PSI-CAs it requires. Q1 is the
least complex query because it translates straight into a BN-PSI-CA; Q5 is the most
complex one because the inequality requires one intersection per bit.

4.7.6

Query execution cost

To quantify the end-to-end cost of DJoin, we ran each of our five example queries
over a synthetic dataset of 15,000 rows per database, and we measured the completion time and the overall amount of network traffic that was sent.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show our results. The simplest query (Q1) took 58 minutes,
and the most complex query (Q5) took 448 minutes, or slightly less than seven and a
half hours; the traffic was between 42.7 MB and 340 MB. Both metrics should scale
roughly linearly with the size of the sets and the number of set intersections in the
query, and a comparison with our microbenchmarks from Section 4.7.3 confirms
this.
The completion times are much higher than the completion times one would
expect from a traditional DBMS, but recall that DJoin is not meant for interactive
use, but rather for occasional analysis tasks or research studies. For those purposes,
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Figure 4.8: Total query execution time for each of the example queries from Table 4.2.
an hour or two should be acceptable. Also, recall that the best previously known
method for executing such queries is general MPC, which is impractical at this scale.
To illustrate how much DJoin improves performance over straightforward MPC,
we implemented our simplest query (Q1) directly in FairplayMP. A version for two
databases of just eight (!) rows had 9,700 gates and took 40 seconds to run; we were
unable to test larger databases because this produced crashes in FairplayMP. The runtimes we observed increased quadratically with the number of rows, which suggests
that this approach is not realistic for the database sizes we consider. While there
are other MPC frameworks that are significantly faster than FairplayMP, for two
reasons, they are unlikely to be viable for executing join queries: first, the quadratic
asymptotic dependence is inherent in any naive join execution, and second, much
of the computational advances have been in MPC frameworks that take advantage
of arithmetic circuits to optimize execution, which join queries do not benefit from
as they involve large sequences of boolean choices.
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Figure 4.9: Total network traffic for each of the example queries from Table 4.2.

4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced two new primitives, BN-PSI-CA and DCR, that
can be used to answer queries over distributed databases with differential privacy
guarantees, and we have presented a system called DJoin that can execute SQL-style
queries using these two primitives. Unlike prior solutions, DJoin is not restricted to
horizontally partitioned databases; it supports queries that join databases from different curators together. The key insight behind DJoin is that many distributed join
queries can be rewritten in terms of operations on multisets. Not all SQL queries
can be transformed in this way, but many can, including counting queries with conjunctions and disjunctions of equality tests, as well as certain inequalities.
In order to provide provable privacy guarantees, DJoin does not take advantage
of decades of work in database performance optimization, such as with prefetching,
caching, batching, and query rewriting. This is necessarily the case, until each optimization is proven private. Without proof, we might inadvertently create a side
channel, since many optimizations depend upon the actual underlying private data.
DJoin is not fast enough for interactive use, but, to the best of our knowledge,
the only known alternative for distributed differentially private join queries is secure
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multi-party computation, which is orders of magnitude slower. Also, most of the
computational cost is due to BN-PSI-CA, which is trivially scalable and can thus
benefit from additional cores.
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5
Verifiable Differential Privacy

5.1 Introduction
When working with private or confidential data, it is often useful to publish some
aggregate result without compromising the privacy of the underlying data set. For
instance, a cancer researcher might study a set of detailed patient records with genetic
profiles to look for correlations between certain genes and certain types of cancer. If
such a correlation is found, she might wish to publish her results in a medical journal
without violating the privacy of the patients. Similar challenges exist in other areas,
e.g., when working with financial data, census data, clickstreams, or network traffic.
In each of these scenarios, there are two separate challenges: privacy and integrity.
As we have seen in this dissertation, protecting the privacy of the subjects who contributed the data is clearly important, but doing so effectively is highly nontrivial.
On the other hand, without the original data it is impossible for others to verify
the integrity of the results. Mistakes can and do occur (even when the author is a
Nobel prize winner (Herndon, Ash, and Pollin, 2013)), and there have been cases
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where researchers appear to have fabricated or manipulated data to support their
favorite hypothesis (Blake, Watt, and Winnett, March 3, 2011; Deer, February 8,
2009; Interlandi, October 22, 2006); this is why reproducibility is a key principle
of the scientific method. Overall, this leaves everyone dissatisfied: the subjects have
good reason to be concerned about their privacy, the audience has to blindly trust
the analyst that the results are accurate, and the analyst herself is unable to reassure
either of them, without violating privacy.
While differential privacy can reliably protect privacy, it does not help with integrity. Indeed, it makes things worse: even if the private data set were made publicly available, it would still not be possible to verify the published results, since the
analyst can freely choose the noise term. For instance, if there are really 47 cancer
patients but the analyst would for some reason prefer if the count were 150, she
can simply claim to have drawn the noise term +103 from the Laplace distribution
(which has support on all the reals).
This chapter proposes a solution to this problem: we present VerDP, a technique for privacy-preserving data analysis that offers both strong privacy and strong
integrity guarantees. Like several existing tools, VerDP provides the analyst with a
special query language in which to formulate the computation she would like to perform on the private data set. VerDP then analyzes the query and tries to certify two
separate properties: 1) that the query is differentially private, and 2) that there is an
efficient way to prove, in zero knowledge, that the query was correctly evaluated on
the private data set. The former ensures that the result is safe to publish, while the
latter provides a way to verify integrity. To prevent manipulation, VerDP ensures
that the analyst cannot control the random noise term that is added to the result,
and that this, too, can be verified in zero knowledge.
Our approach builds on our prior work on the Fuzz compiler (Reed and Pierce,
2010; Gaboardi, Haeberlen, Hsu, Narayan, and Pierce, 2013), which uses a linear
type system to certify queries as differentially private, as well as on the Pantry sys-
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tem (Braun, Feldman, Ren, Setty, Blumberg, and Walfish, 2013) for proof-based
verifiable computation. However, a simple combination of Fuzz and Pantry does
not solve our problem. First, there are differentially private queries that, if straightforwardly expressed as verifiable programs, would leak private information through
the programs’ structures (e.g. those that employ data-dependent recursion). We address this problem by creating a verifiable subset of Fuzz, called VFuzz, that prevents
these leaks without substantially compromising expressiveness. Second, because differential privacy is typically used with large data sets, a naïvely constructed verifiable
program would be enormous, and constructing proofs would take far too long. To
overcome this challenge, we break queries down into smaller components that can
be proved more quickly and that can take advantage of parallelism and batch processing. This allows us to amortize the high setup costs of verifiable computation.
We built a prototype implementation of VerDP, and evaluated it by running
several differentially private queries that have been discussed in the literature, from
simple counting queries to histograms and k-means clustering. We found that a histogram query on a private data set with 63,488 entries resulted in a 20 kB proof that
took 32 Amazon EC2 GPU instances less than two hours to generate (an investment
of approximately $128, at current prices) and that could be verified on one machine
in about one second. In general, our results show that a research study’s results can
be verified quite efficiently even without access to fast networks or powerful machines. Moreover, the cost of constructing a proof, while high, is not unreasonable,
given that it can be done offline and that it only needs to be done once for each
research study. Proof generation time can be further improved by adding machines,
as VerDP is highly parallelizable.
VerDP does not protect against malicious analysts who intentionally leak private
data. But it makes experiments based on private data verifiable and repeatable for the
first time — a key requirement for all experimental science. Our main contributions
are as follows:
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Figure 5.1: The Verifiable Differential Privacy Scenario.
• VFuzz, a query language for computations with certifiable privacy and verifiable integrity (Section 5.4);
• The design of VerDP, a system for verifiable, differentially private data analysis
(Section 5.5); and
• A prototype implementation of VerDP and its experimental evaluation (Sections 5.6 and 5.7).

5.2 Overview
Figure 5.1 illustrates the scenario we address in this chapter. A group of subjects
makes some sensitive data, such as information about their income or their health,
available to a curator. The curator then grants access to the resulting data set db
to a (carefully vetted) group of analysts, who study the data and then publish their
findings to a group of readers. This separation between curator and analyst reflects a
common practice today in large-scale studies using sensitive data, where the raw data
is often hosted by a single organization, such as the census bureau, the IPUMS data
sets (IPUMS), the iDASH biomedical data repository (iDASH), or the ICPSR data
deposit archive (ICPSR). Each analyst’s publication contains the results of at least
one query q that has been evaluated over the private data set db; typical examples of
queries are aggregate statistics, such as the average income of a certain group, or the
number of subjects that had a certain genetic condition.
We focus on two specific challenges. First, the subjects may be concerned about
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their privacy: the published result q(db) might accidentally contain “too much” information, so that readers can recover some or all of their sensitive data from it.
This concern could make it more difficult for the curator to recruit subjects, and
could thus restrict the data sets that are available to potential analysts. Second, some
readers may be concerned about integrity: a dishonest analyst could publish a fake
or biased q(db), and a careless analyst could have made mistakes in her calculations
that would invalidate the results. Since the data set db is sensitive and the readers do
not have access to it, the analyst has no way to alleviate such concerns.

5.2.1

Goals

In designing a system for this scenario, we focus on enforcing two properties:
• Certifiable privacy: It should be possible to formally prove, for a large class
of queries q, that the result q(db) does not leak too much information about
any individual subject.
• Verifiable integrity: It should be possible to verify that a published result q(db)
is consistent with the private data set db, without leaking any data that is not
already contained in q(db).
These properties help all four parties: The curator could promise the subjects that
all published results will be certified as private, which could alleviate their privacy
concerns and help the curator recruit subjects more easily. The analyst could be
sure that her published results are not de-anonymized later and thus expose her to
embarrassment and potential liability. Finally, interested readers could verify the
published results to gain confidence that they have been properly derived from the
private data — something that is not currently possible for results based on data that
readers are not allowed to see.
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5.2.2

Threat model

The primary threat in our scenario comes from the analyst. We consider two types
of threats: a blundering analyst accidentally publishes results that reveal too much
about the data of some subjects, while a dishonest analyst publishes results that are not
correctly derived from the private data set. Both types of threats have been repeatedly
observed in practice (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008; Barbaro and Zeller, 2006;
Blake et al., March 3, 2011; Deer, February 8, 2009; Interlandi, October 22, 2006);
we note that dishonest analysts would be much harder to expose if differentially
private studies become more common, since the addition of ‘random’ noise would
give them plausible deniability. In this work, we do not consider analysts that leak
the raw data: information flow control is an orthogonal problem to ours, which
focuses on declassified (and published) data.
We rely on the separation of duties between the curator (who collects the data)
and the analyst (who studies it) to prevent a dishonest analyst from maliciously
choosing subjects in order to produce a desired study result. This seems reasonable because real-world data collectors, like the Census Bureau, serve many analysts
and are not likely to have a vested interest in the outcome of any one analyst’s study.
Besides, the data set may be collected, and publicly committed to, long before a
given analyst formulates her query. This is common today in many social science
and medical research projects.
We assume that the set of readers may contain, now or in the future, some curious
readers who will try to recover the private data of certain subjects from the published
results q(db). The curious readers could use the latest de-anonymization techniques
and have access to some auxiliary information (such as the private data of certain
other subjects). However, we assume that readers are computationally bounded and
cannot break the cryptographic primitives on which VerDP is based.
A dishonest analyst might attempt to register many variants of the same query
with the curator, with the hope of obtaining results with different noise terms, and
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then publish only the most favorable result. However, it should not be difficult for
the curator to detect and block such attacks.

5.2.3

Strawman solutions

Intuitively, it may seem that there are several simple solutions that would apply to our
scenario. However, as illustrated by several high-profile privacy breaches (Barbaro
and Zeller, 2006; Bell and Koren, 2007), intuition is often not a good guide when
it comes to privacy; simple solutions tend to create subtle data leaks that can be
exploited once the data is published (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). To illustrate
this point, and to motivate the need for solid formal foundations, we discuss a few
strawman solutions below.
Trusted party: One approach would be to simply have the curator run the analyst’s
query herself. This is undesirable for at least two reasons. First, such a system places
all the trust in the curator, whereas with VerDP, fraud requires collusion between
the curator and the analyst. Second, such a design would not allow readers to detect
non-malicious errors in the computation, as they can with VerDP.
ZKP by itself: Another approach would be to use an existing tool, such as ZQL (Fournet, Kohlweiss, Danezis, and Luo, 2013), that can compile computations on private
data into zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). Although such systems would prevent
readers from learning anything but a query’s results, they do not support differential
privacy, and so they would not provide any meaningful limit on what readers could
infer from the results themselves. For example, suppose that the private data db
consists of the salary si of each subject i, and that the analyst publishes the average
salary q(db) := (∑i si )/|db| . If an adversary wants to recover the salary s j of some
subject j and already knows the salaries of all the other subjects, he can simply compute s j := |db| · q(db) − ∑i̸= j si . In practice, these attacks can be a lot more subtle;
see, e.g., (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008).
Naïve combination of DP and ZKP: A third approach would be to modify an
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function kMeansCluster (db: data) {
centers := chooseInitialCenters();
repeat
centers := noise(update(db, centers));
until (centers.converged);
return centers;
}

Figure 5.2: A very simple program for which a naïvely constructed ZKP circuit
would leak confidential information.
existing differentially private data analysis tool, such as PINQ (McSherry, 2009)
or Airavat (Roy et al., 2010), to dynamically output a circuit instead of executing
a query directly, and to then feed that circuit to a verifiable computation system
like Pinocchio (Parno, Gentry, Howell, and Raykova, 2013). Performance would
obviously be a challenge, since a naïve translation could produce a large, unwieldy
circuit (see Section 5.5.4); however, a much bigger problem with this approach is
that private data can leak through the structure of the circuit, which Pinocchio and
similar systems assume to be public. Figure 5.2 shows a sketch of a very simple
program that could be written, e.g., in PINQ, to iteratively compute a model that
fits the private data. But since the number of iterations is data-dependent, no finite
circuit can execute this program for all possible inputs – and if the circuit is built for
the actual number of iterations that the program performs on the private data, an
attacker could learn this number by inspecting the circuit, and then use it to make
inferences about the data. To reliably and provably prevent such indirect information
leaks, it is necessary to carefully co-design the analysis tool and the corresponding
ZKP, as we have done in VerDP.
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5.3 Background
5.3.1

Proof-based verifiable computation

VerDP builds on recent systems for proof-based verifiable computation (Braun et al.,
2013; Parno et al., 2013). These systems make it possible for a prover P to run a
program Ψ on inputs x and to then provide a verifier V with not only the results
Ψ(x), but also with a proof π that demonstrates, with high probability, that the pro-

gram was executed correctly. (In our scenario, the analyst would act as the prover,
the program would be the query, and any interested reader could become a verifier.)
This correctness guarantee only depends on cryptographic hardness assumptions,
and not on any assumptions about the prover’s hardware or software, which could
be arbitrarily faulty or malicious. Furthermore, these systems are general because
they typically offer compilers that transform arbitrary programs written in a highlevel language, such as a subset of C, into a representation amenable to generating
proofs. This representation, known as constraints, is a system of equations that is
equivalent to Ψ(x) in that proving knowledge of a satisfying assignment to the equations’ variables is tantamount to proving correct execution of the program.
VerDP uses the Pantry (Braun et al., 2013) system for verifiable computation,
configured with the Pinocchio (Parno et al., 2013) proof protocol. Together, Pantry
and Pinocchio have two other crucial properties. First, unlike other systems that
require the verifier to observe the program’s entire input, Pantry allows the verifiable
computation to operate on a database stored only with the prover, as long as the
verifier has a commitment to the database’s contents. (In Pantry, a commitment to
a value v is Comm(v) := HMACr (v), i.e., a hash-based message authentication code
of v with a random key r. Comm(v) binds the prover to v – he can later open the
commitment by revealing v and r, but he can no longer change v – and it also hides
the value v until the commitment is opened.) Second, Pinocchio enables the proof of
computation to be non-interactive and zero-knowledge. As a result, once the proof is
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generated, it can later be checked by any verifier, and the verifier learns nothing about
the program’s execution or the database it operated on, other than what program’s
output implies. If the computation described by the program is differentially private
— as is true of all well-typed VFuzz programs (Reed and Pierce, 2010) — and if
the program itself is compiled without looking at the private data, then neither the
output nor the structure of the proof can leak any private data.
The full details of Pinocchio’s proof protocol are beyond the scope of this chapter,
but there is one aspect that is relevant here. In Pinocchio’s proof protocol, some party
other than the prover (e.g., the verifier) first generates a public evaluation key (EK)
to describe the computation, as well as a small verification key (VK). The prover then
evaluates the computation on the input x and uses the EK to produce the proof π ;
after that, anyone can then use the VK to check the proof.

5.3.2

Computing over a database

As we mention above, Pantry allows Ψ to compute over a database that is not included in the inputs x and outputs Ψ(x), which, in VerDP’s case, comes from the
curator. Pantry makes this possible by allowing the prover P to read and write
arbitrarily-sized data blocks from a block store. To prevent P from lying about
blocks’ contents, blocks are named by the collision resistant hashes of their contents, and the compiler transforms each read or write into a series of constraints corresponding to computing the block’s hash and comparing it to the expected value
(i.e. the block’s name). In this way, a computationally-bound P can only satisfy
the constraints C if it uses the correct data from the block store.
Ψ can compute new block names during its execution and retrieved blocks can

contain the names of other blocks, but the name of at least one block must be known
to the verifier V . One possibility is to include the database’s root hash in the input
x that V observes. But, in VerDP, readers cannot be allowed to see the root hash

because it could leak information about the database’s contents. Instead, x only con95

tains a cryptographic commitment to the database’s root hash supplied by the curator (Braun et al., 2013, §6). The commitment binds the analyst to the database’s
contents while hiding the root hash from readers. Furthermore, the compiler inserts
constraints into C that are only satisfiable if the analyst correctly opens the commitment to the database’s root hash.

5.3.3

Performance of verifiable computation

Despite recent improvements, verifiable computation systems impose significant
overhead on P , often by a factor of up to 105 (Braun et al., 2013). For verification,
however, each new program has high setup costs, but every subsequent execution of
that program (on different inputs) can be verified cheaply. Creating an EK and a
VK takes time linear in the number of steps in the program — often tens of minutes for the curator — but then readers can verify π in seconds. Not surprisingly,
MapReduce-style applications, where a small program is executed many times over
chunks of a larger data set, are ideally suited to these limitations, and VerDP exploits
this fact (see Section 5.5.2). Note that commitments are relatively costly in Pantry,
and so VerDP uses them sparingly.

5.4 The VFuzz language
VerDP’s query language is based on the Fuzz language for differentially private
data analysis (Reed and Pierce, 2010; Haeberlen et al., 2011; Gaboardi et al.,
2013) because: 1) it is sufficiently expressive to implement a number of practical differentially-private queries, and 2) it uses static analysis to certify privacy
properties without running the query or accessing the data.

5.4.1

The Fuzz query language

We begin by briefly reviewing the key features of the Fuzz query language. Fuzz is
a higher-order, dependently typed functional language; queries are written as func96

tions that take the data set as an argument and return the value that the analyst is
interested in. Fuzz’s type system for inferring the sensitivity of functions is based on
linear types (Reed and Pierce, 2010). It distinguishes between ordinary functions
f : τ → σ that can map arbitrary elements of type τ to arbitrary elements of type σ ,

and functions f : τ ⊸k σ that have an upper bound k on their sensitivity – in other
words, a change in the argument can be amplified by no more than k in the result.
The sensitivity is used to calculate how much random noise must be added to f’s
result to make it differentially private.
Fuzz offers four primitive functions that can operate directly on data sets: map,
split, count, and sum. map : τ bag → (τ → σ ) ⊸ σ bag1 applies a function of type

τ → σ to each element of type τ , whereas split : τ bag → (τ → bool) ⊸ τ bag extracts

all elements from a data set d that match a certain predicate of type τ → bool . With
the restriction that τ bag = σ bag = db both functions take a database and a predicate
function of appropriate type, and return another data set as the result. count d :
db → R returns the number of elements in data set d , and sum d : db → R sums up

the elements in data set d ; both return a number.
Fuzz also contains a probability monad ⃝ that is applied to operations that have
direct access to private data. The only way to return data from inside the monad is to
invoke a primitive called sample that adds noise from a Laplace distribution based
on the sensitivity of the current computation. Reed and Pierce (2010) has shown
that any Fuzz program with the type db → ⃝τ is provably differentially private;
intuitively, the reason is that the type system prevents programs from returning values
unless the correct amount of noise has been added to them.
Figure 5.3 shows a “hello world” example written in Fuzz that returns the (noised)
number of persons in a data set whose age is above 40. over_40 is a function with
type row→bool . The split primitive maps this function over each individual row,
and counts the rows where the result of over_40 was true. This result is noised with
1 Fuzz

uses the type bag to refer to multisets. A τ bag is a multiset consisting of τ elements.
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function over_40(r : row) : bool {
r.age > 40
}
function main (d :[1] db) : fuzzy num {
let peopleOver40 = split over_40 d in
return sample fuzz count peopleOver40
}

Figure 5.3: A simple program written in Fuzz that counts the individuals over 40 in
a database of individuals’ ages.
sample, and returned as the final output.

5.4.2

From Fuzz to VFuzz

Fuzz already meets one of our requirements for VerDP: it can statically certify queries
as differentially private, without looking at the data. However, Fuzz programs cannot directly be translated to circuits, for two different reasons: 1) the size of the data
set that results from a split can depend on the data, and 2) map and split allow arbitrary functions and predicates, including potentially unbounded, data-dependent
recursion. Thus, if the execution of a Fuzz program were naïvely mapped to a circuit,
the size and structure of that circuit could reveal facts about the private input data.
Our solution to this problem consists of two parts. To address the first problem,
all internal variables of type db have a fixed size equal to that of the input database,
and VFuzz uses a special “empty” value that is compatible with map and split but
is ignored for the purposes of count and sum. To address the second problem, we
require map functions and split predicates to be written in a restricted subset of
C that only allows loops that can be fully unrolled at compile time and disallows
unbounded recursion.
We refer to the modified language as Verifiable Fuzz or VFuzz. Clearly, not all
Fuzz programs can be converted into VFuzz programs, but all practical Fuzz pro98

grams we are aware of can be converted easily (for more details, see Section 5.7.1).
VFuzz is slightly less convenient than Fuzz because the programmer must switch between two different syntaxes, but map and split functions are usually small and simple. They could be automatically translated to C in most cases, using standard techniques for compiling functional programs efficiently, but this is beyond the scope of
this chapter.
We note that there is an interesting connection between the above problem and
the timing side channels in Fuzz programs that we identified (and fixed) in Chapter 3: the data dependencies that cause the circuit size to change are the same that
also affect query execution time, and vice versa. Fuzz takes a different approach to
the second problem: it introduces timeouts on map functions and split predicates,
and if the timeout is exceeded, the function or predicate aborts and returns a default
value. In principle, we could use this approach in VerDP as well; for instance, we
could introduce a cap on the number of constraints per map or split, unroll the
function or predicate until that limit is reached, and return a default value if termination does not occur before then. Although this approach would enable VFuzz to
be more expressive, it would yield a highly inefficient set of constraints.

5.4.3

Are VFuzz programs safe?

With these changes, all VFuzz programs can be translated to circuits safely, without
leaking private data. To see why, consider that all VFuzz programs could be partitioned into two parts: one that operates on values of type db (and thus on un-noised
private data) and another that does not. We refer to the former as the “red” part and
to the latter as the “green” part. Valid programs begin in red and end in green, but
they can alternate between the two colors in between – e.g., when a program first
computes a statistic over the database (red), samples it (green), and then computes
another statistic, based on the sampled output from the earlier statistic (red). The
boundary from red to green is formed by count and sum, which are the only two
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functions that take a db as an argument and return something other than db.
Crucially, all the red parts can be translated statically because 1) the only values
they can contain outside of map and split are of type db, which has a fixed size; 2) the
functions and predicates in VFuzz’s map and split are written directly in restricted
C; and 3) the four data set primitives (map, split, count, and sum) can be translated
statically because they simply iterate over the entire data set. We emphasize that,
because circuits are generated directly from VFuzz programs without looking at the
private database, the resulting circuits cannot depend on, and thus cannot leak, the
private data in any way.
What about the green parts? These are allowed to contain data-dependent recursion (and generally all other features of the original Fuzz), but the only way that data
can pass from red to green is by sampling, which adds the requisite amount of noise
and is therefore safe from a privacy perspective. (Unlimited sampling is prevented
by the finite privacy budget.) Indeed, since the green parts of a VFuzz program can
only look at sampled data, and the differential privacy guarantees remain even with
arbitrary post-processing (Dwork et al., 2006b), there is no need to translate the green
parts to circuits at all – the analyst can simply publish the sampled outputs of the red
parts, and the readers can re-execute the green parts, e.g., using the standard Fuzz
interpreter, or any other programming language runtime, incurring no additional
cryptographic overhead.

5.5 The VerDP system
This section describes VerDP’s design and how it realizes verifiable, privacy-preserving
data analysis for queries written in VFuzz.

5.5.1

VerDP’s workflow

Figure 5.4 illustrates VerDP’s workflow, which consists of the following steps:
1. The database curator collects the private data of each subject into a data set
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Figure 5.4: Workflow in VerDP. The numbers refer to the steps in Section 5.5.1.
db, and then publishes a commitment Comm(db) to it (Section 5.5.3). The

curator also creates and maintains a privacy budget for the data set.
2. An analyst requests the data set from the curator and is vetted. If her request is
granted, the analyst studies the data, formulates a hypothesis, and decides on
query q for which she wants to publish the results.
3. The analyst submits q to the curator,2 who compiles and typechecks it with the
VFuzz compiler to ensure that it is differentially private. If q fails to typecheck
or exceeds db’s privacy budget, the analyst must reformulate q.
4. If q is approved, the compiler converts all of the “red” portions of q into a
series of verifiable programs (Ψ1 , . . . , Ψm ) (see Section 5.5.2). For each Ψi , the
curator generates an evaluation key EKi and a verification key V Ki , and gives the
EK s to the analyst while making the V K s public. Finally, the curator generates

a random seed r, gives it to the analyst, and publishes a commitment to it
Comm(r).
5. The analyst runs q by executing the verifiable programs and publishes the result
q(db). She adds noise to q(db) by sampling from a Laplace distribution using
2 VerDP

actually enables a further separation of duties: because they can be created solely from q,
the EK s could be generated by a party other than the curator, which never has to see db at all.
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a pseudorandom generator seeded with r. In addition, every time she runs Ψi
— and she often runs a given verifiable program multiple times (see below)
— she uses the corresponding EKi to produce a proof π that the program was
executed correctly (Section 5.5.4). She then publishes the proofs πi . Finally,
for every value v passed from one verifiable program to another, she publishes
a commitment Comm(v).
6. Readers who wish to verify the analyst’s results obtain q and begin running
its “green” portions. Every time they reach a “red” portion, they obtain the
corresponding proofs, commitments, and verification keys and check that that
portion of q was executed correctly (Section 5.5.5). If they successfully verify
all of the “red” portions of q and obtain the same result as the analyst after
running the “green” portions, they accept the results.
Next, we explain each of these steps in more detail.

5.5.2

The structure of VFuzz programs

VerDP’s design is guided by both the properties of the VFuzz language (Section 5.4)
and the performance characteristics of verifiable computation (Section 5.3.3). On
the one hand, we observe that the “red” portions of every VFuzz query have a similar
MapReduce-like structure: first, there is a map phase where some combination of
map functions and split predicates are evaluated on each row of the data set inde-

pendently, and second, there is a reduce phase where some combination of count
and sum operators aggregate the per-row results. Finally, there is a phase that adds
random noise to this aggregate value. Returning to the example in Figure 5.3, the
map phase corresponds to the split operator with the over40 predicate, the reduce
phase corresponds to the count operator, and the noise phase corresponds to the
sample operator. On the other hand, verifiable computation is most efficient, not

when there is a large monolithic program, but in a MapReduce setting where a small
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Figure 5.5: The MapReduce-like structure of VFuzz programs. The small circles represent commitments, and the labels at the top show the parts of the over40 program
from Figure 5.3 that correspond to each phase.
program is executed many times over chunks of a larger data set, thereby amortizing
the high setup costs.
These observations led us to the design shown in Figure 5.5. The VFuzz compiler converts each phase of every “red” section into its own independent verifiable
program, written in a restricted subset of C. These three verifiable programs are compiled separately, and the curator generates a separate EK and V K for each one. To
amortize each program’s setup costs, we exploit the fact that both the map and reduce
phases are embarrassingly parallel: their inputs can be partitioned and processed independently and concurrently. Thus, the map and reduce programs only operate on
chunks of their phase’s input, and the analyst processes the entire input by running
multiple map and reduce instances, potentially in parallel across multiple cores or
machines.3 We refer to these instances as tiles because VerDP must run enough tiles
to cover the entire data flow. For each tile that she executes, the analyst produces a
3 Pantry’s

MapReduce implementation exploits similar parallelism (Braun et al., 2013, §4), but
VerDP’s use case is even more embarrassingly parallel. Whereas in Pantry, each mapper has to produce
an output for every reducer, in VerDP each mapper instance only needs to send input to a single
reducer instance.
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proof π that readers must verify. Fortunately, these proofs are small and cheap to
verify.
If a VFuzz query is broken down into separate verifiable programs, how does the
analyst prove to readers that she has correctly used the output v of one phase as the
input to the next without revealing un-noised intermediate values? The answer is
that, for each tile in each phase, she publishes a commitment Comm(v) to the tile’s
output, which is given as input to a tile in the next phase (blue circles in Figure 5.5).
The analyst can only satisfy the constraints of each phase’s verifiable program if she
correctly commits and decommits to the values passed between phases. Readers can
later use the Comm(v)s along with the proofs (π s) for each instance in each phase to
verify the “red” portions of the query.

5.5.3

Committing to the data set

Recall our verifiable integrity goal: the readers should be able to verify that some published result r was produced by evaluating a known query q over a private database
db – without having access to the database itself! To make this possible, the curator

publishes a commitment to the data set Comm(db), and the constraints of every
mapper program are chosen so that they can only be satisfied if the analyst actually
uses the data set corresponding to Comm(db) when executing the query (see Section 5.3.2). In other words, the analyst must prove that she knows a database db
that a) is consistent with Comm(db), and b) produces r = q(db).
In principle, the curator could commit to the flat hash of the data set. But, in
that case, each mapper would have to load the entire data set in order to check its
hash. As a result, each mapper program would require Ω(|db|) constraints, and the
mappers would be too costly for the analyst to execute for all but the smallest data
sets. For this reason, the curator organizes the data set as a hash tree where each tree
node is a verifiable block (see Section 5.3.2), and each leaf node contains the number
of rows that an individual map tile can process; we refer to the latter as a leaf group.
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The curator can then commit to the root hash of this tree. In this way, each map tile
only needs O(log |db|) constraints.
Because all loop bounds and array sizes must be determined statically, the number
of rows in each leaf must be fixed at compile-time. The number of rows per leaf must
be chosen carefully, as it affects the runtime of the map tiles. Having too few per leaf
is inefficient because even opening the commitment to the db’s root hash incurs a
high cost that is best amortized across many rows. But having too many rows per leaf
results in a map tile that takes to long to execute and exhausts the available memory.
As each map tile processes at least one leaf, the number of leaves represents an upper
bound on the available parallelism.
Beside committing to the data set, the curator also commits to a random seed r
that the analyst uses to generate noise (see Section 5.5.4). This seed must be private
because if it were known to the readers, then they could recompute the noise term,
subtract it from the published result, and obtain the precise, un-noised result of
the query. The seed could be chosen by the curator, or the research subjects could
generate it collaboratively.

5.5.4

Phases of VerDP computations

Recall from Section 5.4.3 that VFuzz programs consist of red and green parts. Before
VerDP can generate tiles for a query, it must first identify all the red parts of the
query; this can be done with a simple static analysis that traces the flow of the input
data set db to the aggregation operators (count and sum) that mark the transition to
green.
The map phase: Every mapper program has a similar structure. It has at least two
inputs: Comm(db) and an integer that identifies which leaf of the data set tree it
should process. It then proceeds as follows. First, it verifiably opens Comm(db)
and then retrieves its leaf of the data set by fetching O(log |db|) verifiable blocks.
Second, it performs a sequence of map and split operations on each row in its leaf
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independently. Third, it aggregates the results of these operations across the rows in
its leaf using either the sum or the count operator. Finally, it outputs a commitment
to this local aggregate value that is passed along to the reduce phase.
The reduce phase: Ideally, the reduce phase could just consist of a single instance
of a single program that verifiably decommitted to all of the map tiles’ outputs,
computed their sum, and then committed to the result. Unfortunately, the high
cost of verifiably committing and decommitting means that each reduce tile can
only handle a handful of input commitments. Consequently, VerDP must build a
“tree” of reduce tiles that computes the global sum in several rounds, as illustrated
in Figure 5.5. Thus, if k is the number of map tiles, then the reduce phase consists
of O(log k) rounds of reduce tiles. However, within each round except the last one,
multiple reduce tiles can run in parallel. In our experiments (see Section 5.7), we use
reducers that take only two commitments as input in order to maximize the available
parallelism.
Notably, all VFuzz queries use the same programs for their reduce and noise
phases. Thus, the curator only has to generate an EK and V K for these programs
once for all analysts, substantially reducing the work required to approve an analyst’s
query.
The noise phase: The noise phase adds random noise drawn from a Laplace distribution to the aggregate results of the previous phases. The single noise tile has
four inputs: 1) the sensitivity s of the computation whose result is being noised,
2) the privacy cost ε of that particular computation, 3) the curator’s commitment
Comm(db) to the original data set, and 4) Comm(r), the curator’s commitment to a
random 32-bit seed r. The noise tile works by first converting the seed to a 64-bit
fixed-point number r̄ between 0 and 1, and then computing εs · ln(r̄), using one extra
bit of randomness to determine the sign. If the input is in fact chosen uniformly
at random, then this process will result in a sample from the Lap(s/ε ) distribution.
Since our verifiable computation model does not support logarithms natively, our
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implementation approximates ln(r̄) using 16 iterations of Newton’s method. We
also use fixed-point (as opposed to floating-point) arithmetic to avoid an attack due
to Mironov (2012), which is based on the fact that the distance between two adjacent floating-point values varies with the exponent. To provide extra protection
against similar attacks, our noise generator could be replaced with one that has been
formally proven correct, e.g., an extension of the generator from (Hawblitzel et al.,
2014) or the generation circuit from (Dwork et al., 2006a).

5.5.5

Proof verification

An interested reader who wants to verify the analyst’s computation needs four ingredients: 1) the curator’s commitment to the data set the analyst has used; 2) the
exact VFuzz code of the queries; 3) the VK and the query index that the curator has
generated for the analyst; and 4) the analyst’s proof.
The reader begins by using VerDP to type-check each of the queries; if this check
fails, the analyst has failed to respect differential privacy. If the type check succeeds,
VerDP will (deterministically) compile the query into the same set of tiles that the
analyst has used to construct the proof. The reader now verifies the proof; if this
fails, the analyst has published the wrong result (or the wrong query).
If the last check succeeds, the reader has established that the red parts of the
published query were correctly evaluated on the data set that the curator collected,
using a noise term that the analyst was not able to control. As a final step, the reader
plugs the (known but noised) output values of each red part into the green part of
the VFuzz program and runs it through an interpreter. If this final check succeeds,
the reader can be satisfied that the analyst has indeed evaluated the query correctly,
and since the proof was in zero knowledge, he has not learned anything beyond the
already published values. Thus, VerDP achieves the goals of certifiable privacy and
verifiable integrity we have formulated in Section 5.2.1.
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5.5.6

Limitations

VerDP’s integrity check is limited to verifying whether a query q, given as a specific
VFuzz program, will produce a certain result when evaluated over the data set that the
curator has committed to. This does not mean that q actually does what the analyst
claims it will do – a blundering analyst may have made a mistake while implementing
the query, and a dishonest analyst may intentionally formulate an obfuscated query
that appears to do one thing but actually does another. In principle, the readers can
detect this because the code of the query is available to them, but detecting such
problems is not easy and may require some expertise.
Not all differentially private queries can be expressed in VFuzz, for at least two
reasons. First, there are some useful primitives, such as the GroupBy in PINQ (McSherry, 2009), that are not supported by the original Fuzz, and thus are missing in
VFuzz as well. This is not a fundamental limitation: Fuzz can be extended with new
primitives, and these primitives can be carried over to VFuzz, as long as the structure of the corresponding proofs does not depend on the private data. Second, it is
known (Gaboardi et al., 2013) that some queries cannot be automatically certified as
differentially private by Fuzz or VFuzz because the proof relies on a complex mathematical truth that the type system fails to infer. This is because Fuzz, as a system
for non-experts, is designed to be automated as much as possible. Gaboardi et al.
(2013) shows that some of these limitations can be removed by extending the type
system; also, analysts with more expertise in differential privacy could use a system
like CertiPriv (Barthe, Köpf, Olmedo, and Zanella-Béguelin, 2013) to complete the
proof manually. However, these approaches are beyond the scope of this chapter.

5.6 Implementation
VerDP builds upon two core programs—the VFuzz compiler and typechecker, for
certifying programs as differentially private, and the Pantry verifiable computation
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system, for compiling to a circuit, generating zero knowledge proofs of correct circuit
execution, and verifying the results of the generated proofs. Verifiable programs are
written in a restricted subset of C without recursion or dynamic loops.
Our VFuzz compiler is based on our Fuzz compiler; we modified the latter to emit
functions in restricted C, and we wrote some additional libraries in C to support the
privileged Fuzz operators map and split, as well as for generating Laplace noise. We
also modified the Fuzz compiler to accept VFuzz programs as input, as detailed in
Section 5.4.
A single VFuzz query results in multiple verifiable programs, depending on the
number of sample calls. For a given sample, the VFuzz compiler outputs a map tile
program, which is run in parallel on each leaf group. The reduce tile and noising tile
programs are fixed and identical across all queries. A single sample requires a tree of
reducers, but each individual component of the reducer is the same. The tree is run
until there is a single output, which is the actual un-noised result of the sample call
in VFuzz. The final step is to input this value to the Laplace noising program, which
outputs the final noised result.
For verification, each individual tile needs to be checked separately. However,
since the outputs are not differentially private, only commitments to the outputs are
sent. Only the final output from the noising tile is differentially private and thus
sent in the clear.
The VFuzz compiler ignores post-processing instructions. Fuzz allows for arbitrary computation outside the probability monad for pretty-printing, etc., but these
are not necessary to protect privacy. Since it would be expensive (and unnecessary) to
compute these post-processing steps as verifiable programs, we discard them during
proof generation and simply re-execute them during verification.
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Query
over-40
weblog
census
kmeans

Type
Counting
Histogram
Aggregation
Clustering

LoC mod.
2 / 45
2 / 45
9 / 50
46 / 148

Samples
1
2
4
6

From
(Dwork et al., 2006b)
(Dwork et al., 2006b)
(Chawla et al., 2005)
(Blum et al., 2005)

Table 5.1: Queries we used for our experiments (based on Fuzz 3), lines of code
modified, and the inspirations.

5.7 Evaluation
Next, we report results from an experimental evaluation of our VerDP prototype.
Our experiments are designed to answer three key questions: 1) Can VerDP support
a variety of different queries?, 2) Are the costs low enough to be practical?, and 3)
How well does VerDP scale to larger data sets?

5.7.1

Queries

We used four different queries for our experiments. The first three are the queries that
were used to evaluated Fuzz 3: weblog computes a histogram over a web server log
that shows the number of requests from specific subnets; census returns the income
differential between men and women on a census data set; and kmeans clusters a set
of points and returns the three cluster centers. Each of these queries is motivated by a
different paper from the privacy literature (Dwork et al., 2006b; Chawla et al., 2005;
Blum et al., 2005), and each represents a different type of computation (histogram,
aggregation, and clustering). We also included our running example from Figure 5.3
as an additional fourth query; we will refer to it here over-40 because it computes
the number of subjects that are over 40 years old. Table 5.1 shows some statistics
about our four queries.
Since VerDP’s query language differs from that of Fuzz, we had to modify each
query to work with VerDP. Specifically, we re-implemented the mapping function of
each map and the predicate of each split in our safe subset of C. As Table 5.1 shows,
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these modifications were minor and only affected a very few lines of code, and mostly
involved syntax changes in the mapping functions from functional to imperative.
Importantly, the changes from Fuzz to VFuzz do not reduce the expressiveness of the
queries nor degrade their utilities. We also inspected all the other example programs
that come with Fuzz, and found that each could have been adapted for VerDP with
small modifications to the code; none used constructs (such as unbounded recursion)
that VerDP does not support. This suggests that, in practice, the applicability of
VerDP’s query language is comparable to Fuzz.

5.7.2

Experimental setup

Since Pantry can take advantage of GPU acceleration to speed up its cryptographic
operations, and since VerDP can use multiple machines to run map and reduce tiles
in parallel, we use 32 cg1.4xlarge instances on Amazon EC2 for our experiments.
This instance type has a 64-bit Intel Xeon x5570 CPU with 16 virtual cores, 22.5 GB
of memory, and a 10 Gbps network card. We used the MPI framework to distribute
VerDP across multiple machines. We reserved one machine for verification, which
is relatively inexpensive; this left 31 machines available for proof generation.
For our experiments, we used a leaf group size of 2,048, the largest our EC2
instances could support without running out of memory. (Recall that this parameter,
and thus the “width” of the map tiles, needs to be defined in advance by the curator
and cannot be altered by the analyst.) We then generated four synthetic data sets
for each query, with 4,096, 16,384, 32,768, and 63,488 rows, which corresponds to
2, 8, 16, and 31 map tiles. Recall that VerDP’s privacy guarantee depends critically
on the fact that the structure of the computation is independent of the actual data;
hence, we could have gained no additional insights by using actual private data.
Although some real-world data sets (e.g., the U.S. census data) are larger than our
synthetic data sets, we believe that these experiments demonstrate the key trends.
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5.7.3

Commitment generation

Before the curator can make the data set available to analysts, he must first generate
a commitment to the data set, and publish it. To quantify the cost, we measured the
time taken to generate commitments for various database sizes, as well as the size of
the commitment itself.
As expected, generating the commitment is not expensive: we found that the time
varied from 1 second for our smallest data set (4,096 rows) to 3.1 seconds for our
largest data set (63,488 rows). The size of the commitment is 256 bits, independent
of the size of the data set; recall that the commitment is generated through a hash
tree, and only the final root-hash is committed to. These costs seem practical, even
for a curator with modest resources – especially since they are incurred only once for
each new data set.

5.7.4

Query compilation and EK generation

With the database and the commitment, the analyst can formulate and test queries
in VFuzz. Once the analyst has finalized the set of queries, she sends the queries to
the curator, who compiles them and generates an EK and VK for each tile, as well as
the seeds for each noise generator. Since the curator has to independently recompile
the VFuzz queries, it is important that compilation is relatively inexpensive.
Recall from Section 5.4.3 that a single VFuzz query can contain multiple “red”
parts, depending on the number of sample calls, and that each part can consist of
multiple map tiles (depending on the database size), a tree of reduce tiles, and a single
noising tile that returns the final “sample”. Our queries contain between one and six
sample calls each. However, recall that compilation is only required for each distinct

tile; since most map tiles (and all reduce and noising tiles) are identical, compilation
time depends only on the width of the map tile, but not on the size of the data set.
Time: To estimate the burden on the curator, we benchmarked the time it took to
compile our map, reduce, and noising tiles, and to generate the corresponding EKs
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Figure 5.6: Compilation time for map tiles as a function of tile size, for (512, 1024,
2048) rows per tile.
and VKs; our results are shown in Figure 5.6. We can see that compilation and key
generation is relatively inexpensive, taking at most 84 minutes for the largest query
(k-means). The compiled binaries are also relatively small, taking at most 14 MB.
Note that the curator must compile the binaries in order to produce the keys; the
analyst can either download the compiled binaries from the curator or recompile
them locally with the EK.
Complexity: We also counted the number of constraints that were generated during
compilation, as a measure of complexity. Figure 5.7 shows the results for each of
the map tiles. We separate out the number of constraints used for 1) commitment
operations, and 2) actual computation. The figure shows that a large part of the
overhead is in commitment operations. This is why small tile widths are inefficient.
To summarize, the work done by the curator is relatively inexpensive. Generating commitments is cheap and must be done only once per data set. The costs of
compilation and key generation are nontrivial, but they are affordable as they do not
grow with the size of the data set.
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Figure 5.7: Constraints generated for map tiles with (512, 1024, 2048) rows per
tile.

5.7.5

Query execution and proof generation

Once the analyst receives the compiled queries from the curator, she must run the
resulting verifiable program to generate the results and proof, and then make the
proof available to interested readers. This is the most computationally expensive
step. To quantify the cost, we generated proofs for each of our four queries, using
varying data set sizes.
Microbenchmarks: We benchmarked the map tiles for each of our four queries,
using a tile width of 2,048 rows, as well as the reduce and noising tiles. (The
cg1.4xlarge instances could not support map tiles with more rows, due to memory

limitations.) Our results are shown in Figure 5.8. Proof generation times depend
on the complexity of the query but are generally nontrivial: a proof for a k-means
map tile takes almost two hours. However, recall from Section 5.5.2 that VerDP can
scale by generating tile proofs in parallel on separate machines: all the map tiles and
all the reduce tiles at the same level of the reduce tree can run simultaneously. As a
result, the time per tile does not necessarily limit the overall size of the data set that
can be supported.
Projected runtimes: For larger databases that require k > 1 map tiles, we estimate
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Figure 5.8: Time to generate proofs for map tiles of width 2,048, as well as the
reduce and noising tiles.
the end-to-end running time and cost. Since all the map tiles can be run in parallel
when k machines are available, a data set of size 2048 ∗ k can be run in the time it
takes to run a single mapper. The reduce tiles, however, need to be run in at least
log2 k stages, since we need to build a binary tree until we reach a single value, which

is then handed to a noising tile. Figure 5.9 shows our estimates; doubling the size of
the data set only adds a constant amount to the end-to-end proof generation time,
although it does of course double the number of required machines.
Projected scaling: Figure 5.10 shows the projected runtime for different levels of
parallelization. VerDP scales very well with the number of available machines; for
instance, 32 machines can handle 524K rows in about 230 minutes. Eventually,
scalability is limited by the dependencies between the tiles – e.g., map needs to run
before reduce, and the different levels of the reduce tree need to run in sequence.
Note that the depth of the reduce tree, and thus the amount of non-parallel work,
grows logarithmically with the database size.
End-to-end simulation: To check our projected runtimes, we ran two end-to-end
experiments, using the over-40 and weblog queries, data sets with 63, 488 rows, and
our 32 cg1.4xlarge EC2 instances. We measured the total time it took to generate
each proof (including the coordination overhead from MPI). The results are overlaid
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Figure 5.9: Projected time to generate proofs for databases of (8k, 16k, 32k, 62k)
rows.
on Figure 5.9 as individual data points; they are within 3.3% of our end-to-end
results, which confirms the accuracy of our projections. We also note that, at $2
per instance hour at the time of writing, the two experiments cost $64 and $128,
respectively, which should be affordable for many analysts.
Proof size: The largest proof we generated was 20 kB. The very small size is expected:
a Pinocchio proof is only 288 bytes, and the commitments are 32 bytes each; each
tile produces a single Pinocchio proof and up to three commitments, depending on
the type of tile. Thus, a proof can easily be downloaded by readers.

5.7.6

Proof verification

When an interested reader wants to verify a published result, she must first obtain the
commitment from the curator, as well as the query and the proof from the analyst.
She must then recompile the query with VerDP and run the verifier. To quantify
how long this last step would take, we verified each of the tiles we generated.
Figure 5.11 shows our projected verification times, based on the number of tiles
and our measured cost of verifying each individual tile. We also verified our two endto-end proved queries, and those are displayed in the graph. The measured results
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Figure 5.10: Estimated time to run the “over 40” query using a variable number of
machines. Note log-log scale.
were 4.7% faster than our projections, confirming the accuracy of the latter.
We note that, during verification, tiles do not have dependencies on any other
tiles, so verification could in principle be completely parallelized. But, at total run
times below 3.5 seconds in all cases, this seems unnecessary – readers can easily perform them sequentially.

5.7.7

Summary

Our experiments show that VerDP can handle several realistic queries with plausible data set sizes. The time to generate proofs is nontrivial, but nevertheless seems
practical, since proof generation is not an interactive task – it can be executed in the
background, e.g., while the analyst is working on the final version of the paper.
VerDP imposes moderate overhead on the curator. This is important as a curator
might be serving the data set to many different analysts. Appropriately, the bulk of
the computation time is borne by the analysts. Since the proofs are small and can
be verified within seconds, proof verification is feasible even for readers without fast
network connections or powerful machines.
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Figure 5.11: Projected time to verify complete programs for databases of (16k, 32k,
62k) rows on one machine.

Appendix: Proof of Privacy
Outline: Our goal is to prove that if a VFuzz program has the appropriate type, then
the result is differentially private. Our proof is based on the proof in Reed and Pierce
(2010) that all Fuzz programs that have a certain type are differentially private.
First, we will list the changes from Fuzz to VFuzz, and show that the Fuzz proof
transfers in a straightforward way. Second, we show that the way we break down
VFuzz programs into multiple separate Pantry programs does not affect our differential privacy guarantee. Finally, we show that our Pantry execution does not leak
any additional information.
We briefly review the main privacy theorem statement from Fuzz(Reed and
Pierce, 2010, §4): Executing a Fuzz program of type !n db ⊸ ⃝R, and adding
Laplace noise proportional to n ∗ ε is ε −differentially private.
Sketch: The Fuzz type system gives differential privacy through three theorems:
progress and preservation (the standard type safety theorems), and a novel metric
preservation theorem. Progress states that a well typed program will execute to completion: i.e. it will not get stuck. Type preservation states that a program with a
given type will retain that type when executed. The metric preservation theorem
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states that every execution of a well-typed function has at most the sensitivity that
the type system assigns. The type notation !n τ refers to the initial metric on τ “scaled
up” by a factor of n.
Proposition : Executing a VFuzz program of type !n db ⊸ ⃝R, and adding Laplace
noise proportional to n ∗ ε is also ε −differentially private.
Proof: VFuzz differs from Fuzz in two ways: first, through the removal of Fuzz
terms, and second, through the addition of some terms. Importantly, there are no
additions, removals, or modifications to the Fuzz type language. The Fuzz type safety
and metric preservation theorems are by induction(Reed and Pierce, 2010), and
so removal of terms in VFuzz requires no additional proof burden, as we simply
eliminate those inductive cases. The second way in which VFuzz differs from Fuzz is
through adding terms for imperative functions, and assigning them types. We now
prove that those terms do have the types we assign them in VFuzz.
VFuzz permits imperative functions in two situations: an imperative function
as an argument to “map”, with type µ → clipped R, (the clipped refers to a return
value in the range [0, R]), and an imperative function as an argument to “split” with
type µ → bool .
Consider the “split” in Fuzz(Reed and Pierce, 2010) without imperative functions: it has type split : τ bag → (τ → bool) ⊸ τ bag4 . Note that the second
argument is a function f of type (τ → bool). Each invocation of f on a single row
can influence the output by at most the inclusion or exclusion of a single row in
the output of the whole split. This is exactly the differential privacy guarantee we
seek, so we need no additional examination of the internal structure of the function.
Thus, it suffices to verify that the output of f is a boolean. Thus, the result of a
“split” in VFuzz with imperative functions retains the same type as in Fuzz.
Similarly, consider the “map” in Fuzz without imperative functions: it has type
map : τ bag → (τ → σ ) ⊸ σ bag from (Reed and Pierce, 2010). The second argument
4 In

Fuzz, “bag” is a multiset. Thus, the entire database is a multiset of rows, so if τ is the type of
a row, the database has type τ bag
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is a function f from τ to σ . In VFuzz, we restrict τ to type row, and σ to type clipped
R. Thus, we only need to check that the provided imperative function f has type
row → clipped R. As in Airavat (Roy et al., 2010), we can ensure this by truncating

the return value of the function to the maximum allowed value before returning it.
Proposition: Splitting a single VFuzz program into separate subprograms each consisting of a single sample call retains the differential privacy guarantee.
Proof: A VFuzz program can consist of multiple subprograms. Each VFuzz subprogram is compiled into a single Pantry program. A subprogram is defined as a
function (or nested series of functions) that ends in a single sample call. The type
of a sample call in VFuzz is R ⊸ ⃝R. Thus, a valid VFuzz subprogram must consist of a function, or a composed series of functions that has finite sensitivity with a
return type of R, followed by a sample. Since a VFuzz subprogram takes a database
as input, each VFuzz subprogram has type !n db ⊸ ⃝R.
A VFuzz program may aggregate the results of multiple subprograms and postprocess the results, or simply print them individually. The post-processing that
happens after sampling is public. By the composition theorem of differential privacy(McSherry and Talwar, 2007, §2.3), it suffices to examine each subprogram independently, and add up the epsilon costs to get a single εtotal -differentially private
program.
Proposition: If a Pantry zero-knowledge proof leaks no information about the external block store, executing the VFuzz program in Pantry does not leak any additional
information.
Proof: The VFuzz compiler does not have access to private data when it constructs
the Pantry programs. Thus, the structure of the Pantry circuits do not contain any
private information. We make no changes to the Pantry runtime, which guarantees
that the Pinocchio proof leaks no information about the external block store. Since
the private data set is only stored in the external block store of Pantry, none of the
private data is leaked through the Pantry zero knowledge proofs.
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5.8 Related work on verifiable computing
Verifiable computation: Although there has been significant theoretical work on
proof-based verifiable computation for quite some time (see (Parno et al., 2013;
Setty, Vu, Panpalia, Braun, Blumberg, and Walfish, 2012b; Vu, Setty, Blumberg,
and Walfish, 2013) for surveys), efforts to create working implementations have
only begun recently. These efforts have taken a number of different approaches.
One set of projects (Cormode, Mitzenmacher, and Thaler, 2012; Thaler, Roberts,
Mitzenmacher, and Pfister, 2012; Thaler, 2013), derived from interactive proofs
as in Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum (2008), uses a complexity-theoretic protocol that does not require cryptography, making it very efficient for certain applications. But, its expressiveness is limited to straight-line programs. Another line of
work (Setty, McPherson, Blumberg, and Walfish, 2012a; Setty et al., 2012b; Setty,
Braun, Vu, Blumberg, Parno, and Walfish, 2013; Vu et al., 2013) combines the interactive arguments of Ishai, Kushilevitz, and Ostrovsky (2007) with a compiler that
supports program constructs such as branches, loops, and inequalities and an implementation that leverages GPU cryptography. Zaatar (Setty et al., 2013), the latest
work in that series, exploits the constraint encoding of Gennaro, Gentry, Parno,
and Raykova (2013) for smaller, more efficient proofs. This encoding is also used
by Pinocchio (Parno et al., 2013), which offers similar functionality to Zaatar while
supporting proofs that are both non-interactive and zero-knowledge. Pantry (Braun
et al., 2013), the system we use for VerDP, enables verifiable programs to make use
of state that is only stored with the prover and not the verifier while supporting
both the Zaatar and Pinocchio protocols. Recently, several promising works have
enabled support for data-dependent loops via novel circuit representations (BenSasson, Chiesa, Genkin, Tromer, and Virza, 2013; Ben-Sasson, Chiesa, Tromer,
and Virza, 2014; Wahby, Setty, Ren, Blumberg, and Walfish, 2014); a future version of VerDP could incorporate techniques from these systems to improve VFuzz’s
expressiveness.
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Language-based zero-knowledge proofs: Several existing systems, including
ZKPDL (Meiklejohn, Erway, Küpçü, Hinkle, and Lysyanskaya, 2010), ZQL (Fournet et al., 2013), and ZØ (Fredrikson and Livshits, 2014), provide programming
languages for zero-knowledge proofs. ZQL and ZØ are closest to our work: they
enable zero-knowledge verifiable computations over private data for applications
such as personalized loyalty cards and crowd-sourced traffic statistics. Like VerDP,
they provide compilers that convert programs written in a high-level language to
a representation amenable to proofs, but VerDP provides a stronger privacy guarantee. ZQL and ZØ allow the programmer to designate which program variables
are made public and which are kept private to the prover, but he or she has no way
of determining how much private information the verifier might be able to infer
from the public values. VerDP, the other hand, bounds these leaks using differential
privacy.

5.9 Conclusion and Future Work
VerDP offers both strong certifiable privacy and verifiable integrity guarantees,
which allows any reader to hold analysts accountable for their published results,
even when they depend on private data. Thus, VerDP can help to strengthen reproducibility – one of the key principles of the scientific method – in cases where
the original data is too sensitive to be shared widely. The costs of VerDP are largely
the costs of verifiable computation, which recent advances by Pinocchio (Parno
et al., 2013) and Pantry (Braun et al., 2013) have brought down to practical levels –
particularly on the verification side, which is important in our setting. Even though
the costs remain nontrivial, we are encouraged by the fact that VerDP is efficiently
parallelizable, and it can, in principle, handle large data sets.
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6
Conclusion

6.1 Summary
In this dissertation, we have looked at methods for increasing useful access to private
datasets, even in the face of obstacles such as dispersed datasets, potentially malicious
queriers, and the verifiability needs of modern scientific practices. However, today
this data is justifiably locked away, and will not be available until individual privacy
is provably safeguarded. In order to do so, we have studied three concrete real-world
challenges that arise when providing provable differential privacy guarantees. We
have designed and built systems to address each of these scenarios, and empirically
evaluated their efficacy at solving these challenges.
In Chapter 3, we presented Fuzz, a runtime for secure execution of untrusted
queries. In addition to the differential privacy guarantees on query outputs, Fuzz also
protects against covert-channel attacks. Fuzz provides these guarantees through the
use of a novel primitive called predictable transactions, which executes queries written in the differentially private programming language by Reed and Pierce (2010).
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Finally, we showed some proof-of-concept attacks on existing differential privacy
query systems such as PINQ and Airavat, and we experimentally verified that Fuzz’s
design effectively closed those channels, at the expense of a higher query completion
time.
In Chapter 4, we described DJoin, a system that provides strong differential privacy guarantees while answering distributed queries. Unlike previous systems that
focused only on horizontally partitioned databases, DJoin also supports join queries.
DJoin uses two novel primitives to process join queries: BN-PSI-CA, a differentially
private form of private set intersection cardinality, and DCR, a multi-party combination operator that can aggregate noised cardinalities without compounding the
individual noise terms. Our experimental evaluation showed that DJoin can process
realistic queries at practical timescales.
In Chapter 5, we presented VerDP, a system for private data analysis that provides both verifiability, as well as strong differential privacy guarantees. Differential
privacy, while providing extremely strong guarantees about privacy, does so through
adding noise to the answer: noise that a malicious querier can use to create plausible
deniability. Current scientific practices rely on the ability to verify results, so differentially private studies would be hard to verify. VerDP solves this by providing
verifiability through zero-knowledge proofs of execution, in addition to differential
privacy guarantees. VerDP accepts queries written in a slightly modified version of
the Fuzz query language which we call VFuzz. The VerDP runtime then produces
both a differentially private output as in Fuzz, as well as a zero-knowledge proof of
correctness, which allows independent third parties to verify that the answer was
computed correctly, and that the noise was honestly chosen from the appropriate
distribution in order to achieve privacy. Our experimental evaluation shows that
VerDP successfully processed several different VFuzz queries that were functionally
equivalent to Fuzz queries with minimal source code modification, and generated
zero knowledge proofs in a distributed fashion with a nontrivial but nevertheless
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affordable overhead.

6.2 Future Work
In this dissertation we have explored three particular directions for realizing distributed differential privacy implementations, but there are other directions that
make sense for specific applications.
One example is in the design of Fuzz: while Fuzz uses a special type-system to
only execute queries that are proven differentially private, the run-time is not proven
side-channel free. In particular, it would be useful to prove the post-processing steps,
and budget management private as well, such as in Ironclad (Hawblitzel et al., 2014).
A second example is in the design of DJoin. DJoin was the first distributed
differential privacy runtime to process Join queries. However, we designed DJoin’s
optimizations to consider all participant databases’ resources equally. One scenario
where this might not be true would be when one database is vastly more private than
another. For instance, if a user were joining a health-care database with another less
private database, minimizing the privacy cost with respect to the health-care data
would be more important.
We have already seen in DJoin that optimizing the structure of a distributed query
can affect its runtime. For a more complex query language, optimizations also affect
the total privacy budget used for a given query, and on which participant database
this cost falls on. Users could use an economic model such as that described by Hsu
et al. (2014) to measure the cost to a database of participating in a DJoin query, and
then minimize the total privacy cost.
A second direction would be to make the existing systems faster. Both DJoin and
VerDP have significant overheads in their execution: running times are measured in
hours for real world queries, while the non-private versions take seconds. While
this is significant, it is important to note that both DJoin and VerDP were the first
to allow their respective queries to be executed at all, thus representing a significant
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improvement over not having private access at all. However, it should still be possible
to reduce those runtimes further. In the case of DJoin, one avenue for exploration
would be to consider the existing database optimization literature. If a particular
optimization can be proven differentially private, then DJoin could take advantage
of it. VerDP can also take advantage of future advances in verifiable computing.
Ultimately, DJoin is a still limited to a small class of queries, and broadening
distributed differential privacy to a broader set of queries remains an open problem.
There are important real-world queries, such as Narayan, Papadimitriou, and Haeberlen (2014), that are beyond DJoin, but are still important to be able to answer in
a differentially private fashion.
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